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How Wartime Violence Shapes Post-Conflict Voting: The Electoral Legacy of War in Kosovo

MASTER THESIS

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I hereby declare that I have completed this Master's thesis independently, using only the cited sources, literature, and other professional materials. This paper benefited from the use of OpenAI's ChatGPT for language editing and clarity improvements. I have independently verified the accuracy of all content and assume full responsibility for the final manuscript.

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All praise and gratitude belong to Allah, the Lord of the worlds.

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Title: How Wartime Violence Shapes Post-Conflict Voting: The Electoral Legacy of War in Kosovo

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Abstract: This paper examines how wartime violence is associated with post-conflict electoral outcomes in Kosovo. Using settlement-level data for Kosovo Assembly elections from 2010 to 2025, linked to wartime victimization, housing destruction, prewar settlement characteristics, and census controls, the analysis tests whether more heavily affected settlements gave greater support to parties associated with active, armed resistance. The main specification compares settlements within the same municipality. The results show that higher logged Albanian victimization is positively associated with active-resistance party vote share from 2010 through 2021, while the relationship weakens in 2025. The same pattern is not found for passive-party support or Vetëvendosje vote share. Housing-damage results are more mixed, and instrumental-variables estimates based on prewar Serbian settlement geography are interpreted as supportive but not definitive. Overall, the findings suggest that wartime violence remained politically salient in Kosovo by reinforcing electoral support for parties linked to armed resistance, although this legacy appears to have weakened in the most recent election.

JEL Classification: D72, D74, P16, N44

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Název: Jak válečné násilí formuje poválečné hlasování: Volební dědictví války v Kosovu

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Abstrakt: Tato práce zkoumá, jak válečné násilí souvisí s poválečnými volebními výsledky v Kosovu. S využitím dat na úrovni sídel pro volby do Kosovského shromáždění v letech 2010 až 2025, propojených s údaji o válečné viktimizaci, destrukci bydlení, předválečných charakteristikách sídel a kontrolními proměnnými ze sčítání lidu, analýza testuje, zda více zasažená sídla poskytovala větší podporu stranám spojeným s aktivním, ozbrojeným odporem. Hlavní specifikace porovnává sídla v rámci téže obce. Výsledky ukazují, že vyšší logaritmovaná albánská viktimizace je pozitivně spojena s podílem hlasů pro strany aktivního odporu v období od roku 2010 do roku 2021, zatímco v roce 2025 tento vztah slábne. Stejný vzorec se neobjevuje u podpory pasivních stran ani u podílu hlasů pro Vetëvendosje. Výsledky založené na škodách na bydlení jsou smíšenější a odhady pomocí instrumentálních proměnných založené na předválečné geografii srbského osídlení jsou interpretovány jako podpůrné, nikoli však definitivní. Celkově zjištění naznačují, že válečné násilí zůstávalo v Kosovu politicky významné tím, že posilovalo volební podporu stran spojených s ozbrojeným odporem, ačkoli toto dědictví se v posledních volbách zdá být slabší.

Klasifikace JEL: D72, D74, P16, N44

Klíčová slova: Poválečné společnosti, hnutí odporu, volební chování, Kosovo

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1 Introduction

Voting is a central institution of democracy because it allows citizens to influence government formation and public policy while ensuring political representation across different social groups (Dahl, 1998; Lijphart, 1999). Yet electoral behavior is shaped not only by current policy preferences, economic conditions, or party platforms, but also by historical experiences that leave durable marks on voters and party systems. One such experience is violent conflict. In post-conflict societies, elections often take place in the shadow of war, where political actors, wartime identities, and local memories of violence continue to influence democratic competition. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2024), 59 state-based conflicts were recorded worldwide in 2023, the highest number since systematic data collection began in 1946. Understanding how conflict reshapes political behavior is therefore important not only for the study of democratization, but also for understanding how war leaves long-run effects on political development.

A particularly important dimension of conflict is the form that resistance takes. Resistance movements may rely primarily on armed struggle or on nonviolent political and institutional mobilization. These strategies can generate different organizational structures, symbolic narratives, and claims to postwar legitimacy. Parties rooted in armed resistance may claim credibility through sacrifice, protection, and military struggle, while parties rooted in nonviolent resistance may claim legitimacy through institution-building, moderation, and diplomatic strategy. Voters in post-conflict settings may therefore evaluate political actors not only through contemporary policy preferences, but also through memories of who protected, represented, or failed them during war. In this sense, the distinction between active, armed resistance and passive, nonviolent resistance may continue to shape electoral alignments long after the conflict itself has ended.

Kosovo provides a compelling setting in which to study these questions. During the 1990s, ethnic Albanian resistance to Serbian rule developed along two prominent trajectories. One was passive and nonviolent, organized around Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), which built parallel institutions and emphasized peaceful resistance. The other was active and armed, pursued by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which increasingly framed liberation through military struggle. After the war, these two resistance traditions did not disappear. They were transformed into competing political legacies that shaped party identities, narratives of legitimacy, and patterns of electoral support. Parties associated with the KLA inherited the symbolic capital of armed resistance, while LDK remained closely associated with the passive-resistance tradition.

This paper examines how wartime violence is associated with post-conflict electoral

outcomes in Kosovo. More specifically, it asks whether settlements that experienced more intense wartime violence subsequently gave higher vote shares to parties associated with active, armed resistance and weaker support to parties associated with passive, nonviolent resistance. The central argument is that local exposure to violence made sacrifice, protection, and wartime credibility more politically salient, thereby strengthening the electoral appeal of parties rooted in the armed-resistance bloc. This argument does not imply that violence mechanically determined voting behavior. Rather, it suggests that wartime exposure can make resistance identities and liberation-war narratives more important for later electoral competition.

The paper uses newly assembled settlement-level data linking Kosovo Assembly election returns from 2010, 2014, 2017, 2019, 2021, and 2025 to measures of wartime violence, housing destruction, prewar settlement characteristics, and census controls. The main violence measure is the logged number of Albanian victims per 1,000 residents at the settlement level. I also examine alternative measures, including victimization using a 1981 population denominator and housing-damage proxies. The main empirical design compares settlements within the same municipality, allowing the analysis to absorb broad municipality-level differences in political history, administrative structure, geography, wartime intensity, and party organization.

The results show a clear and persistent relationship between wartime victimization and support for active-resistance parties. In the main municipality fixed-effects specifications, settlements with higher logged Albanian victimization give higher vote shares to active-resistance parties from 2010 through 2021. The standardized estimates suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in victimization is associated with approximately two to four percentage points higher active-party vote share during this period. By 2025, however, the relationship weakens and becomes statistically insignificant. This suggests that the electoral legacy of wartime violence was durable, but not permanent.

The relationship is also politically specific. Wartime victimization is consistently associated with higher active-party support, but it does not generate an equally strong positive relationship with passive-party support or Vetëvendosje vote share. Descriptive evidence, victimization-tercile comparisons, Drenica-exclusion checks, and leave-one-municipality-out exercises all point to the same broad pattern: areas more exposed to Albanian victimization were more supportive of parties linked to the armed resistance, especially in the first two decades after the war. Housing-damage proxies are positively associated with active-party vote share, particularly in pooled models, but they provide less stable within-municipality evidence than the victimization measure.

The paper also explores instrumental-variables estimates based on prewar Serbian set-

tlement geography. These estimates generally point in the same direction as the main fixed-effects results before 2025, including in specifications that exclude the Drenica core. However, because the exclusion restriction is demanding, I interpret the IV results as supportive rather than definitive causal evidence. The main empirical contribution is to document a robust within-municipality association between wartime victimization and support for active-resistance parties across multiple postwar elections.

The paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it brings together research on post-conflict politics, political memory, and resistance legacies by examining how different wartime strategies can structure electoral behavior after war. Second, it provides new settlement-level evidence from Kosovo across multiple elections, showing that the relationship between wartime victimization and resistance-linked voting persisted for many years but weakened in the most recent election. Third, it shows that the political effects of conflict depend on how wartime exposure is measured: direct human victimization appears more consistently related to postwar partisan alignment than physical destruction alone.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the research questions and hypotheses. Section 3 reviews the literature. Section 4 provides historical background. Section 5 develops the theoretical framework. Section 6 describes the data and measurement. Section 7 presents descriptive patterns. Section 8 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 9 reports the results. Sections 10 and 11 discuss implications and conclude.

2 Research Questions and Hypotheses

This paper addresses one central research question and one related comparative question. The central question is whether settlements that experienced more intense wartime violence subsequently gave higher post-conflict vote shares to parties associated with active, armed resistance. The related question is whether this pattern was accompanied by lower electoral support for the main party rooted in passive, nonviolent resistance.

Building on the theoretical framework developed below, I derive three main hypotheses. First, settlements with higher wartime violence per capita are expected to exhibit higher post-conflict vote shares for parties associated with active, armed resistance. Second, settlements with higher wartime violence per capita are expected to exhibit lower post-conflict vote shares for the main party associated with passive, nonviolent resistance. Third, the positive relationship between wartime violence and support for active-resistance parties is expected to be stronger in settings where wartime legacies were more easily translated into post-war political mobilization, particularly in settlements with stronger organizational reach and greater symbolic salience of the war.

These hypotheses reflect the broader argument of the paper: wartime violence may shape post-conflict electoral outcomes not only through its direct human costs, but also by reinforcing the organizational and symbolic advantages of actors linked to armed resistance. The empirical analysis evaluates these expectations using settlement-level electoral returns, wartime violence measures, and municipality fixed effects.

3 Literature Review

My research is situated within several domains of the academic literature. First, it is rooted in the work on civil resistance and political violence. A key distinction in this field concerns the different political consequences of violent (active) versus nonviolent (passive) resistance. Foundational research by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) shows that nonviolent movements are more likely to lead to democratic outcomes than violent ones. Nonviolent resistance is often associated with more inclusive political participation (Pinckney, 2018), while violent uprisings may contribute to militarization and elite domination in post-conflict settings (Acemoglu et al., 2012).

Second, my work engages with the literature on post-conflict democratization and electoral behavior. Much of this literature examines how conflict legacies shape democratic transitions and voter choices. For instance, Fortna (2008) and Flores and Nooruddin (2012) highlight how the terms of conflict settlement and the nature of peacebuilding interventions influence post-conflict elections. While these studies provide valuable insights into institutional trajectories, relatively little is known about how the type of resistance during conflict—violent versus nonviolent—shapes electoral outcomes. I seek to fill this gap by investigating whether different forms of resistance produce divergent patterns in voting behavior after the conflict ends.

Third, my analysis draws from a broader literature on the political legacies of conflict and collective action. Previous research has shown that exposure to violence and mobilization leaves lasting imprints on political preferences, institutional trust, and patterns of civic engagement (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Rozenas et al., 2017). More recent work has examined how these legacies influence attitudes toward authority (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). This paper contributes to this literature by focusing specifically on the resistance strategy employed during conflict as a critical variable affecting post-conflict voting dynamics.

Fourth, some studies emphasize the impact of historical events on shaping voter behavior, particularly when these events are invoked during political campaigns. For example, Ochsner and Roesel (2024) examine how collective memories of historical events, when activated by political campaigns, can influence contemporary xenophobia and radicalization in Austria. Similarly, Gharibyan (2024) investigates how different modes of remembrance—collective versus family-based—affect political attitudes and behavior, using the case of two Russian "betrayal" policies to illustrate how the legacy of repression shapes contemporary political preferences. However, to the best of my knowledge, these issues have not yet been explored in the context of Kosovo. A closely related strand of research

examines how wartime sacrifice and military experience shape later electoral behavior. De Juan et al. (2024) study the political consequences of World War I battle deaths in Germany and show that areas with higher casualty fatality rates later displayed stronger support for right-wing nationalist parties, including the Nazi Party. Their findings suggest that collective experiences of wartime loss can be politically mobilized and translated into support for nationalist movements. Koenig (2023) similarly examines the political role of World War I veterans in Weimar Germany and finds that veteran presence contributed to a persistent shift from left-wing to right-wing voting. These studies are relevant for this paper because they show that wartime exposure does not disappear after conflict ends, but can shape postwar electoral alignments through narratives of sacrifice, nationalism, and the political authority of wartime actors.

Finally, this study also intersects with work on identity politics and movement legacies. Scholars including Cederman et al. (2013) and Horowitz (2000) have emphasized how identity-based mobilization during conflict can entrench social divisions and shape postwar political alignments. At the same time, research on rebel governance and resistance organization suggests that the structure and ideology of resistance movements can persist into the post-conflict period, influencing party formation and electoral competition (Mampilly, 2011; Staniland, 2014).

This paper contributes to the literature on post-conflict politics and the political legacies of war by examining how wartime violence is associated with support for parties linked to different resistance traditions in Kosovo. Rather than treating postwar voting only as a product of contemporary party competition, it links electoral outcomes to the distinction between active armed resistance and passive nonviolent resistance during the 1990s. The Kosovo case is useful because these resistance traditions were represented by distinct postwar party lineages, allowing the analysis to examine whether areas more exposed to wartime violence gave greater support to parties associated with the armed liberation struggle.

4 Background and Context: The Dual Legacy of Passive and Active Resistance in Kosovo's Post-Conflict Politics

Drawing primarily on Buxhovi's (2013) account of Kosovo's recent history, Kosovo's experience is characterized by systematic repression, violent conflict, and a complex struggle for statehood. After Slobodan Milošević revoked Kosovo's autonomy in 1989, Serbian authorities purged ethnic Albanians from public institutions and imposed control through military and administrative force. In response, the Albanian majority, under Ibrahim Rugova's leadership, organized a parallel society. They ran schools, healthcare systems, tax collection, and political structures informally but effectively outside the Serbian state. This strategy of passive resistance focused on building parallel institutions and preserving national identity, aiming to maintain the momentum for independence and draw international attention to Kosovo's political struggle.

Buxhovi (2013) highlights how Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) embodied the strategy of passive resistance throughout the 1990s. The LDK emphasized patience, dignity, and peaceful endurance, drawing international comparisons to Gandhi's movement in India. Rugova won election as president of an unrecognized parallel Republic of Kosovo and remained firmly committed to nonviolence despite mounting Serbian repression.

Expanding further, the author (2013) notes that by the mid-1990s frustration with the limits of passive resistance had begun to intensify. The international community largely ignored Kosovo's situation, while Serbian police and military forces continued to abuse the Albanian population with impunity. In this environment the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged as an armed insurgent force determined to end Serbian control through guerrilla warfare. Though initially small and fragmented, the KLA quickly gained momentum, particularly in rural areas that had strong traditions of clan-based honor and historical resistance.

In tracing the escalation of violence, Buxhovi (2013) underscores the brutal response of Serbian forces to the rise of the KLA. They razed villages, targeted civilians, and caused mass displacement. The violence peaked during the 1998–1999 Kosovo War, which ended with NATO's military intervention and Serbia's withdrawal. After the war, Kosovo came under United Nations administration (UNMIK), and former resistance groups transformed into formal political parties.

Looking to the post-war period, Buxhovi (2013) explains that the LDK, as the legacy

party of nonviolent resistance, sought legitimacy in Kosovo's new peacetime democracy. Meanwhile, former KLA commanders established the PDK[1], AAK[2], and later NISMA[3], repositioning themselves as national leaders. These parties promoted a different narrative of liberation—one rooted in sacrifice, bravery, and decisive action.

This dual legacy of passive and active resistance shaped post-conflict politics in Kosovo. Elections quickly became more than contests of policies and programs—they served as referenda on competing memories of resistance. For many voters, especially those in areas affected by war, the past remained more salient than the future.

4.1 Observations on Post-War Voting Behavior in Kosovo

Several patterns in Kosovo's post-war electoral history show that wartime experience continues to shape voting behavior:

1) Geographic voting patterns reflect wartime exposure. Regions like Drenica, which experienced intense fighting and suffered heavily under Serbian violence, consistently deliver strong support for parties linked to the KLA (e.g., PDK, AAK). In contrast, areas that experienced less violence or maintained stronger pre-war ties to Rugova's LDK—such as certain urban centers or southeastern districts—tend to support the LDK and its successor parties more consistently (Central Election Commission of Kosovo, 2018, 2021).

2) Candidates with personal or familial wartime credentials perform better in violence-affected areas. Individuals who fought in the KLA, or whose close relatives did, often secure significant electoral support, regardless of their policy positions. Their biographies carry symbolic weight, and campaigns frequently highlight their wartime roles (Insajderi, 2025).

3) Post-war political rhetoric reinforces resistance credentials. Political leaders often invoke wartime sacrifice and frame elections as continuations of the liberation struggle. Parties affiliated with the KLA regularly use patriotic slogans and imagery to connect voting with loyalty to the war's legacy (e.g., Freedom Has a Name[4]).

4) Symbolic figures continue to shape voter sentiment. Ibrahim Rugova, despite advocating nonviolence, maintained strong popularity until his death in 2006. His supporters still

[1]Democratic Party of Kosovo.

[2]Alliance for the Future of Kosovo.

[3]Initiative for Kosovo.

[4]"Freedom Has a Name" is a slogan often used by political parties affiliated with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), invoking the wartime struggle for independence and positioning the act of voting as a continuation of that liberation effort. The slogan emphasizes loyalty to the KLA's legacy and the sacrifices made during the conflict for Kosovo's sovereignty.

revere his image, especially among those aligned with the passive resistance movement. Similarly, former KLA leaders including Hashim Thaçi and Ramush Haradinaj have retained political influence—even in the face of international criminal charges—because voters continue to view them as symbols of wartime leadership.

(a) LDK Support

(b) PDK Support

Figure 1: Post-war political rhetoric and symbolic leadership in Kosovo's electoral politics. The images illustrate how contemporary campaigns draw on wartime narratives and iconic figures to mobilize support. Parties affiliated with the Kosovo Liberation Army frequently invoke themes of sacrifice and liberation, using patriotic slogans and imagery to frame electoral participation as a continuation of the wartime struggle (e.g., "Freedom Has a Name"). At the same time, symbolic figures remain central to voter sentiment: the legacy of Ibrahim Rugova—associated with nonviolent resistance—continues to resonate among his followers, while former KLA leaders such as Hashim Thaçi and Ramush Haradinaj retain political influence as enduring representations of wartime leadership.

Together, these patterns suggest a potential connection between the form of resistance during the war and the political capital it generates afterward. Citizens seem to internalize and carry forward narratives of resistance, particularly when these narratives are grounded in personal or communal experiences of violence. However, this relationship has not yet been systematically tested at the settlement level, which is the central focus of this paper.

4.2 Party Lineage and Ideological Positioning

The active/passive party classification used in this paper should not be understood as an ideological left-right division. Rather, it captures the main historical and symbolic claim through which parties entered postwar political competition. Active resistance parties are those whose legitimacy was closely connected to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the armed struggle, and the narrative of liberation. Passive resistance parties are those linked to Ibrahim Rugova's nonviolent resistance strategy, parallel institutions, and diplomatic efforts during the 1990s.

This distinction matters because Kosovo's party system has not been structured primarily around stable ideological cleavages. Krasniqi (2016) argues that Kosovo's political parties have often had weak ideological profiles and unclear party programs, partly because party competition developed under occupation, international administration, and state-building pressures. Similarly, Lavrelashvili (2020), in the European Party Monitor's Party Passport on Kosovo, distinguishes between parties emerging from military action, such as PDK and AAK, and parties linked to peaceful liberation, such as LDK.

PDK and AAK are therefore classified as active resistance parties because of their historical connection to the KLA legacy, not because they represent a unified ideological family. PDK was founded from the political wing of the KLA and later positioned itself as a centre-right party emphasizing Albanian nationalism, economic liberalism, and Europeanization (Lavrelashvili, 2020). AAK is also commonly associated with the KLA legacy, especially through its leadership and wartime networks, and PDK and AAK have both been described as parties established from the legacy of the KLA (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2020). By contrast, LDK is associated with Rugova's peaceful resistance tradition and with the institutional and diplomatic strategy of the 1990s.

For this reason, the empirical results should not be interpreted as showing that wartime violence increased support for a particular ideology, such as conservatism, social democracy, economic liberalism, or religious politics. Instead, the analysis tests whether areas more exposed to wartime violence gave greater support to parties whose legitimacy was linked to active resistance and the liberation-war narrative. This interpretation is consistent with evidence that Kosovo's parties have often been pragmatic, leader-centred, and only weakly differentiated by ideology (Krasniqi, 2016; Democracy for Development, 2020).

5 Theoretical Framework

5.1 Active and Passive Resistance as Political Legacies

Armed and nonviolent resistance generate different types of organizations, identities, and reputations that may shape democratic competition after conflict. In Kosovo, ethnic Albanian resistance during the 1998–1999 war took two broad forms: active armed struggle through insurgent organizations and passive, nonviolent mobilization through underground schooling, parallel institutions, and peaceful protest. These strategies exposed individuals and communities to different risks and produced distinct networks of leaders, cadres, and followers. In the post-conflict period, these wartime organizations and their elites were transformed into political legacies that continued to structure party competition. Parties with roots in armed resistance could draw on the symbolic capital of having fought for national liberation, while parties associated with passive resistance could claim moral authority based on discipline, institutional continuity, and a principled commitment to nonviolence. The central theoretical question is how these alternative resistance legacies translate into electoral support, and how this translation is conditioned by local exposure to wartime violence.

5.2 Wartime Violence and Post-Conflict Voting

The starting point is a simple framework of voter choice in post-conflict settings. Voters care about security, material well-being, and identity representation. Their experiences during conflict shape beliefs about which political actors are capable of protecting the community and advancing its interests after the war. Let wartime violence per capita measure the intensity of Serbian state repression experienced by local populations. In localities that suffered higher levels of violence, voters are more likely to recall threats to physical security and group survival with greater salience, to develop stronger in-group identities, and to attribute credit for collective defense to armed organizations that confronted the perpetrator. The main theoretical claim is that the effect of resistance type on vote choice is conditional on violence. Armed-resistance parties are expected to be especially attractive where violence was more intense, because their narrative of protection, sacrifice, and military effectiveness resonates more strongly with voters who directly experienced threat and loss. By contrast, parties rooted in nonviolent resistance may be perceived as less effective in the most heavily affected areas, even if they retain credibility where violence was more limited.

5.3 Mechanism 1: Organizational Capacity and Party Machines

The first mechanism emphasizes organizational capacity. Armed resistance requires recruitment, training, logistics, clandestine communication, and coordination across localities. These wartime investments can later be redeployed in electoral politics. Armed organizations often develop dense local structures involving commanders, unit leaders, intermediaries, and sympathizers at the village or neighborhood level. After conflict, these networks may be transformed into party organizations, local brokerage structures, and campaign machines with detailed knowledge of local populations. Former rebel elites may also gain access to state institutions, veteran benefits, and symbolic resources that can be used to reinforce electoral loyalty.

In this framework, wartime organizational strength creates advantages in post-conflict electoral mobilization. Skills acquired in organizing high-risk collective action under repression may also be directly relevant for campaigns, including rally organization, door-to-door canvassing, and turnout efforts. These advantages are expected to be strongest in localities where wartime mobilization was most intense and where networks of veterans and sympathizers remained most deeply entrenched. In such areas, greater violence exposure may reinforce the organizational capacity of parties linked to active resistance, thereby increasing their subsequent vote shares.

Passive-resistance networks, by contrast, are built more around civil society, parallel institutions, and professional associations. They generate organizational capacity oriented toward service provision, negotiation, and institution-building rather than coercion. These networks may also translate into electoral support, particularly in areas with less intense wartime violence, where the demand for protection and retribution was less salient. In the most heavily affected localities, however, these advantages may be weaker if voters place greater weight on security, sacrifice, and loyalty to the armed struggle.

5.4 Mechanism 2: Identity, Credit-Claiming, and Symbolic Politics

The second mechanism operates through identity, credit-claiming, and symbolic politics. Armed resistance generates powerful narratives of sacrifice, heroism, and liberation. Organizations and parties that trace their origins to the armed struggle can present themselves as authentic representatives of the community that resisted Serbian forces. In localities that experienced higher levels of wartime violence, memories of victimization, displacement, and threat are likely to remain especially salient. In such settings, parties

associated with armed resistance can more credibly claim to have defended the community, or at least to have fought back on its behalf.

This mechanism does not require voters to evaluate individual leaders one by one. Rather, it operates through broader partisan reputations and collective memory. Supporters may interpret association with the armed struggle as a signal of toughness, resolve, and historical legitimacy. The emotional salience of martyrdom, injury, and loss may therefore increase the appeal of parties linked to active resistance.

Parties rooted in passive resistance also compete in the symbolic arena. They emphasize moral superiority, discipline, patience, and long-term institutional struggle. This narrative may resonate with voters who value continuity, prudence, and nonviolence, particularly where wartime violence did not reach extreme levels. In the most heavily affected areas, however, voters may judge passive strategies as having failed to prevent suffering, which may reduce their post-conflict appeal relative to parties associated with armed resistance.

5.5 Conceptual Model

Taken together, the theoretical framework posits that wartime violence shapes post-conflict electoral outcomes through its interaction with resistance type. The key explanatory factor is local wartime violence per capita, and the principal political actors are parties associated with active armed resistance and parties associated with passive, nonviolent resistance. The main mechanisms operate through organizational capacity, including networks, resources, and mobilization experience, and through identity and credit-claiming based on protection, sacrifice, and moral authority. The outcome of interest is post-conflict electoral support for these competing resistance legacies, measured by settlement-level party vote shares. In this framework, heavier wartime violence strengthens both the organizational and symbolic advantages of actors associated with active resistance, while potentially weakening the relative appeal of actors linked to passive resistance.

5.6 Testable Implications

The theoretical framework leads directly to the empirical hypotheses presented earlier. If the argument is correct, settlements that experienced more intense wartime violence should subsequently give higher vote shares to parties associated with active, armed resistance and lower vote shares to the main party associated with passive, nonviolent resistance. The empirical strategy in the following sections evaluates these implications using settlement-level electoral returns, wartime violence measures, and municipality fixed

effects.

6 Data and Measurement

6.1 Unit of Analysis and Sample

The empirical analysis is conducted at the settlement level using a newly constructed dataset that links Kosovo Assembly election returns to wartime exposure measures, pre-war demographic characteristics, and post-war census demographics. The unit of analysis is the *vote settlement*, defined as the administrative unit at which the Central Election Commission of Kosovo (CEC) recorded election returns.

The cross-sectional analysis uses the 2010 election as the primary wave, covering 562 usable settlement observations across 32 municipalities after dropping the four northern Serb-majority municipalities that boycotted all elections, settlements with implausibly high marks-to-ballots ratios, and settlements with missing census data. The multi-year analysis extends this to six elections (2010, 2014, 2017, 2019, 2021, and 2025), with usable samples ranging from 468 to 696 settlements per year depending on CEC reporting granularity. The panel analysis uses a balanced sub-sample of 351 settlements observed in all six election years, covering 26 municipalities. Eight municipalities that boycotted the 2021 snap election are excluded from the panel because their absence reflects genuine non-participation rather than random attrition. Full details of sample construction are provided in Appendix A.

6.2 Electoral Outcomes

Kosovo's Assembly elections use an open-list proportional representation system in which each voter casts a single party ballot and may additionally mark up to five candidate preferences. The CEC publishes settlement-level preference-mark counts for each party, not simple ballot counts. Party vote shares are therefore computed as

$$\text{vs}_{ip} = \frac{\text{marks}_{ip}}{\text{total\_marks}_i}, \tag{1}$$

where $\text{total\_marks}_i = \sum_p \text{marks}_{ip}$, ensuring that shares are bounded in $[0, 1]$ and sum to one within each settlement.

Three outcome variables are used throughout the analysis. **Active vote share** (Y_i^A) aggregates the preference-mark shares of parties with direct organizational roots in the Kosovo Liberation Army, principally PDK and AAK and their year-specific coalition forms. **Passive vote share** (Y_i^P) is the share of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK),

the party associated with nonviolent parallel-institution resistance. **Vetëvendosje vote share** (Y_i^{VV}) captures the post-war rejection-politics movement that grew from a small share in 2010 to plurality status by 2021, representing a third resistance narrative distinct from both the KLA legacy and the LDK. Because these parties together do not exhaust the vote, all three are modeled as separate outcomes. Party definitions are harmonised across election years to account for coalition changes; the full mapping is reported in Appendix A.

6.3 Wartime Violence Measures

Albanian victims per capita. The primary violence measure is constructed from a settlement-level killings database compiled from human rights organisation records and archival documentation of Serbian state violence during the 1998–99 conflict. The raw count of Albanian civilian victims in each settlement is divided by the resident population to obtain a per-capita rate, expressed as deaths per 1,000 residents. The preferred specification uses the logged Albanian victimisation rate, defined as $\log(1 +$ Albanian victims per 1,000 residents). This transformation reduces sensitivity to the heavily right-skewed distribution of wartime killings.

Two versions of this measure are used. The first uses 2011 census population as the denominator and is used in the original cross-sectional analysis. The second, preferred in robustness checks, uses 1981 Yugoslav census population as the denominator. This avoids a source of endogeneity in the 2011 denominator: wartime displacement depressed the surviving population in the most heavily affected settlements, mechanically inflating the per-capita victimisation rate. The 1981 denominator is fully pre-treatment, measured 17 years before the conflict. The raw correlation between the two measures is approximately 0.74.

Housing damage proxies. The secondary violence proxies derive from the European Commission's post-conflict housing damage assessment conducted in mid-1999. Three settlement-level variables are constructed. The first is the share of assessed houses completely destroyed, based on Category IV damage. The second is the share of assessed houses with any recorded damage. The third is a severity-weighted housing damage index, which combines damage categories into a single measure of destruction intensity.

The destroyed-housing share is the preferred housing-damage proxy because it provides the clearest signal of extreme physical destruction. Coverage is approximately 435 of the 562 usable 2010 settlements. Settlements not covered by the assessment are assigned zero

damage following the convention used in the construction of the housing-damage dataset.

6.4 Pre-War Demographic Controls

Settlement-level ethnic composition data from the 1981 Yugoslav Population Census are matched to the electoral data to provide controls that pre-date both the conflict and the post-war demographic reshuffling captured by the 2011 census. The 1981 data record Albanian, Serbian, Muslim, and Roma population shares across 22 Yugoslav communes. A crosswalk maps these communes to the 2010 post-independence municipalities; matching to individual settlements uses the same name-normalisation and fuzzy-matching cascade applied to other sources, achieving 87.7 percent coverage.

The key pre-war control variables are the 1981 Albanian population share and the 1981 Serbian population share. These controls are essential for the exclusion restriction arguments developed in Section 8: conditioning on pre-war ethnic composition allows the spatial instruments to be interpreted as operating through Serbian military geography rather than through pre-existing Albanian political culture.

6.5 Standard Controls

All regressions include the natural logarithm of total census population, shares of each ethnic group from the interpolated 2011 census, and an urban indicator. These controls absorb the main between-group variation in political culture and demographic composition. Specifications using the spatial instruments additionally include the pre-war demographic controls described above. Geographic controls, namely logged terrain ruggedness and logged road distance, enter as main effects in specifications that use the terrain-road interaction instrument.

6.6 Instrumental Variables

Three families of instruments are used, each exploiting a different dimension of the pre-war geography of Serbian military operations.

KLA distance instrument. The established instrument is the logged distance from each settlement centroid to the Jashari compound in Prekaz, Skenderaj municipality. This location is treated as the symbolic and operational centre of early KLA mobilisation, and it was the site of a major confrontation between Serbian forces and the Jashari

family in March 1998. Greater proximity to Prekaz is expected to predict higher wartime violence because Serbian counter-insurgency operations were concentrated around areas of early KLA activity, with the Drenica region serving as the geographic heartland of these operations.

This instrument produces strong first-stage statistics in pooled specifications but loses identifying power once municipality fixed effects are included, because much of its variation is cross-municipality. Results using this instrument are therefore reported mainly for continuity with earlier work.

Spatial instruments from 1981 Serbian settlement geography. The preferred instruments exploit the pre-war spatial distribution of Serbian communities. The underlying logic is that Serbian forces were more likely to target Albanian settlements located near Serbian communities or near potential ethnic corridors, where violence could help create or defend contiguous areas of Serbian territorial control. Because this spatial configuration is measured using the 1981 Yugoslav census, it is predetermined relative to the 1998–99 conflict.

The first and preferred spatial instrument is the logged distance to the nearest settlement with a Serbian population share above 20 percent in 1981. Greater distance from a pre-war Serbian-majority or Serbian-concentrated settlement is expected to reduce exposure to wartime targeting through the corridor-creation mechanism.

The second spatial instrument is the local Serbian-neighbourhood exposure measure. It is defined as the population-weighted average 1981 Serbian population share of neighbouring settlements within 10 kilometres. This variable captures whether a settlement was located in a wider local environment with a stronger pre-war Serbian demographic presence. The two spatial instruments can be used jointly in an overidentified system, enabling a Hansen J-test of the exclusion restriction.

The exclusion restriction argument is as follows: conditional on own 1981 Albanian and Serbian population shares and municipality fixed effects, the pre-war Serbian settlement composition of neighbouring areas should affect post-conflict vote shares only through its effect on wartime violence. Unlike the KLA distance instrument, these instruments do not concentrate their identifying variation in the Drenica valley and therefore do not conflate the violence channel with historically elevated Albanian national consciousness in that region. Within-municipality first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics for the logged distance to the nearest Serbian-concentrated settlement range from 20 to 48 across election years.

7 Descriptive Patterns: Wartime Violence and Electoral Realignment

Before turning to the regression analysis, I first examine the main descriptive patterns in the data. The purpose of this section is not to establish causality, but to document the settlement-level variation that motivates the empirical analysis. Three descriptive patterns are especially important. First, Kosovo's party system changed substantially between 2010 and 2025. Parties associated with the active armed resistance were strongest in the early post-war elections, but their average vote share declined over time. In contrast, Vetëvendosje became increasingly important after 2017. Second, local wartime violence varies strongly across settlements and is positively associated with support for active-resistance parties. Third, the Drenica core is a clear historical and electoral outlier, combining high local victimization with exceptionally high support for KLA-linked parties.

Throughout the analysis, I refer to the main historical exposure as local wartime violence. Empirically, this variable is measured as the logged number of Albanian victims per 1,000 residents in each settlement:

$$\text{Wartime Violence}_s = \log(1 + \text{Albanian victims per 1,000 residents}_s),$$

where s indexes settlements. This measure captures the intensity of local exposure to wartime violence during the Kosovo War, adjusted for settlement population size. I also report an alternative version of the measure using the 1981 population denominator, which is useful because it relies on a pre-war population baseline.

7.1 Sample Composition and Pooled Summary Statistics

Table 1 reports the composition of the settlement-level election-year samples. The number of observations varies across elections because of differences in electoral-unit availability, historical exposure coverage, housing damage coverage, and sample restrictions. The sample ranges from 468 observations in 2025 to 696 observations in 2019. The number of municipalities ranges from 26 in 2021 to 34 in 2019 and 2025. In every election year, the sample is predominantly rural. The urban share ranges from 0.050 in 2021 to 0.085 in 2025. Coverage of the main wartime violence measure also varies across years, from 375 non-missing observations in 2025 to 562 in 2010. The 1981-denominator victimization measure is available for 2,718 settlement-election observations, while housing destruction is available for 3,512 observations.

Table 1: Sample Composition by Election Year

Year	Obs.	Munic.	Settlements	Victims	Victims 1981	Damage
2010	562	32	551	562	494	426
2014	601	33	586	546	493	601
2017	681	33	665	550	487	681
2019	696	34	675	543	466	696
2021	640	26	629	518	459	640
2025	468	34	459	375	319	468

Notes: The table reports settlement-election observations, municipalities, distinct settlement names, and non-missing observations for the main exposure variables. "Victims" refers to logged Albanian victims per 1,000 residents using the 2011 population denominator. "Victims 1981" uses the 1981 population denominator. "Damage" refers to the destroyed-housing measure.

Table 2 reports pooled summary statistics for the main outcome, treatment, and control variables. The pooled sample contains 3,648 settlement-election observations for the main vote-share outcomes. Across all elections, the average active-resistance vote share is 41.1 percent, compared with 21.3 percent for the passive-resistance party measure and 22.8 percent for Vetëvendosje. The large standard deviation of active-party support, 23.8 percentage points, indicates substantial settlement-level variation in the electoral strength of parties associated with the active armed resistance.

The main wartime violence measure is available for 3,094 observations. Its mean is 1.637 and its standard deviation is 1.230. The alternative measure using the 1981 denominator has a slightly higher mean of 1.771 and a larger standard deviation of 1.339. Housing destruction is also highly uneven across settlements: the mean destroyed housing share is 0.168, with a standard deviation of 0.195, while the housing damage index has a mean of 0.318 and a standard deviation of 0.301. The average urban share is only 0.062, confirming that the sample is predominantly rural. The average Serb share is 0.044, while the average Bosniak and Roma shares are 0.023 and 0.003, respectively. The 1981 census variables show that the average Albanian population share was 0.841, while the average Serbian share was 0.107. Finally, the mean log distance to KLA-related locations is 3.580.

7.2 Outcome and Exposure Trends Over Time

Table 3 reports descriptive trends by election year. Active-resistance parties had the highest average vote shares in the earlier elections, with settlement-level means of 47.18 percent in 2010 and 49.58 percent in 2014. Their support then declined to 39.42 percent in 2017, recovered partly to 44.11 percent in 2019, and fell to 33.78 percent in 2021 and 30.99 percent in 2025.

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Main Variables

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Active vote share	3,648	41.112	23.831	0.000	98.987
Passive vote share	3,648	21.308	14.482	0.000	73.404
Vetëvendosje vote share	3,648	22.830	18.454	0.000	88.889
Log victims per 1,000	3,094	1.637	1.230	0.000	5.264
Log victims per 1,000, 1981 denom.	2,718	1.771	1.339	0.000	7.920
Destroyed housing share	3,512	0.168	0.195	0.000	1.000
Log population	3,648	7.100	1.132	0.325	11.887
Urban settlement	3,648	0.062	0.241	0.000	1.000
1981 Albanian share	2,718	0.841	0.252	0.000	1.000
1981 Serbian share	2,718	0.107	0.195	0.000	1.000

Notes: Vote shares are measured in percentage points. Wartime victimization is measured as log(1 + Albanian victims per 1,000 residents). The 1981-denominator measure uses pre-war population from the Yugoslav census.

Vetëvendosje follows the opposite pattern. Its average vote share was only 9.04 percent in 2010 and 9.37 percent in 2014, but increased to 21.95 percent in 2017. After a slight decline to 19.17 percent in 2019, it rose sharply to 41.07 percent in 2021 and remained high at 38.46 percent in 2025. Passive-party support is more stable between 2010 and 2019, with averages around 23 to 25 percent, before declining to 13.91 percent in 2021 and partially recovering to 16.18 percent in 2025.

The average level of logged Albanian victimization is relatively stable across election-year samples, ranging from 1.586 in 2010 to 1.664 in 2017 and 2019. The 1981-denominator measure is also stable, ranging from 1.739 in 2021 to 1.799 in 2017. The mean destroyed housing share declines from 0.247 in the 2010 sample to 0.142 in the 2025 sample. This does not imply that housing destruction changed over time, since the damage measure is historical. Rather, it reflects differences in the composition of settlement observations available in each election-year dataset.

Table 3: Outcome and Exposure Trends by Election Year

Year	N	Active	Passive	VV	Victims	Destroyed
2010	562	47.181	22.896	9.038	1.586	0.247
2014	601	49.577	24.162	9.366	1.658	0.174
2017	681	39.418	25.143	21.949	1.664	0.154
2019	696	44.109	24.059	19.173	1.664	0.150
2021	640	33.781	13.915	41.069	1.629	0.161
2025	468	30.987	16.176	38.457	1.617	0.142

Notes: Active, passive, and Vetëvendosje vote shares are settlement-level means in percentage points. "Victims" is logged Albanian victims per 1,000 residents using the 2011 population denominator. "Destroyed" is the share of assessed housing units classified as destroyed.

Figure 2 visualizes the same transformation in Kosovo's party system. Active-resistance parties were the largest bloc in the early period, but their average vote share declined after 2014. Vetëvendosje, by contrast, moved from a small electoral force in 2010 and 2014 to the largest average party bloc in 2021 and 2025. This pattern is important for the empirical analysis because it shows that the relationship between wartime legacies and voting is studied in a changing party system, not in a static electoral environment.



Figure 2: Average Vote Shares by Party Bloc, 2010–2025

7.3 Distribution of Wartime Violence

Table 4 reports the pooled distribution of the main wartime violence measure. The main measure is available for 3,094 settlement-election observations. The mean is 1.637 and the standard deviation is 1.230. The distribution includes 541 zero-victim observations, corresponding to 17.5 percent of non-missing observations. The maximum value is 5.264, indicating that some settlements experienced very high victimization relative to population.

Figure 3 compares the 2011-denominator and 1981-denominator victimization measures. The two measures are strongly positively associated, with a pairwise correlation of 0.814. This indicates that both measures capture similar spatial patterns of wartime exposure, although the 1981 denominator generates a wider upper tail because it relies on the pre-war population baseline.

Table 4: Distribution of Wartime Victimization

Statistic	Value
Observations	3,094
Zero-victim settlement observations	541
Zero-victim share	0.175
Mean	1.637
Standard deviation	1.230
Minimum	0.000
10th percentile	0.000
25th percentile	0.614
Median	1.594
75th percentile	2.462
90th percentile	3.326
Maximum	5.264

Notes: Wartime violence is measured as logged Albanian victims per 1,000 residents using the 2011 population denominator.



Figure 3: Comparison of Wartime Victimization Measures

7.4 Vote Shares by Wartime Violence Tercile

To describe the raw relationship between wartime violence and subsequent voting, I divide settlements into terciles of local wartime violence. The terciles are defined once at the settlement level and then applied to all election years, ensuring that changes over time are not driven by changing tercile definitions. The resulting groups are clearly separated: low-violence settlements have average logged violence around 0.27 to 0.31, medium-violence settlements around 1.57 to 1.59, and high-violence settlements around 3.05 to 3.06.

Table 5 shows that active-party support is consistently higher in more violence-exposed settlements. In 2010, settlements in the highest violence tercile gave active-resistance parties an average vote share of 62.3 percent, compared with 31.1 percent in the lowest tercile. The same ordering is visible in every election year. In 2014, the active-party vote share was 62.5 percent in the high-violence tercile and 35.5 percent in the low-violence tercile. In 2017, the corresponding values were 51.7 and 26.0 percent. In 2019, they were 57.6 and 31.7 percent. In 2021, they were 46.2 and 21.7 percent. By 2025, the gap had narrowed, but it remained visible: active-party support was 40.9 percent in the highest violence tercile and 27.4 percent in the lowest violence tercile.

The patterns for passive-party and Vetëvendosje support are less monotonic. Passive-party support is often highest in the medium-violence group rather than the high-violence group. Vetëvendosje support is also not consistently ordered by wartime violence tercile. For example, in 2021 Vetëvendosje's average vote share was highest in the medium-violence tercile, at 44.6 percent, rather than in the high-violence tercile, where it was 37.8 percent. These descriptive patterns suggest that the raw association between wartime violence and later voting is most pronounced for active-resistance parties.

Figure 4 visualizes the same pattern. In every election year, the high-violence tercile has the highest active-resistance vote share, the medium-violence tercile is in the middle, and the low-violence tercile has the lowest active-resistance vote share. The level of active-party support declines over time in all three groups, but the ordering across violence terciles remains stable. This is one of the main descriptive facts motivating the regression analysis.

Table 6 summarizes the high-minus-low tercile gaps in vote shares. The active-party gap is positive in every election year. It is largest in 2010, when the high-violence tercile exceeds the low-violence tercile by 31.2 percentage points, and remains large in 2014, 2017, 2019, and 2021. By 2025, the gap narrows to 13.4 percentage points. The corresponding gaps for passive-party support and Vetëvendosje support are smaller and less consistent, again

Table 5: Vote Shares by Wartime Violence Tercile

Year	Violence group	N	Log victims	Active	Passive	VV
2010	Low	198	0.267	31.125	21.422	8.954
2010	Medium	185	1.582	49.731	26.608	10.310
2010	High	179	3.050	62.307	20.692	7.815
2014	Low	177	0.296	35.542	24.026	10.377
2014	Medium	187	1.591	51.479	28.140	9.372
2014	High	182	3.051	62.523	21.333	8.001
2017	Low	179	0.304	25.950	25.551	23.674
2017	Medium	185	1.578	41.110	28.250	22.673
2017	High	186	3.059	51.669	22.792	19.619
2019	Low	177	0.309	31.689	24.523	20.035
2019	Medium	183	1.584	45.368	27.519	20.769
2019	High	183	3.053	57.618	21.487	16.742
2021	Low	177	0.296	21.718	13.643	38.127
2021	Medium	170	1.579	32.987	15.635	44.579
2021	High	171	3.060	46.161	11.993	37.795
2025	Low	123	0.311	27.409	15.938	39.888
2025	Medium	137	1.574	30.850	19.503	41.857
2025	High	115	3.065	40.852	14.125	34.851

Notes: Terciles are defined once at the settlement level using logged Albanian victims per 1,000 residents and then applied to all election years. Vote shares are reported in percentage points.



Figure 4: Active-Resistance Vote Share by Wartime Violence Tercile

suggesting that the raw descriptive association with wartime violence is most visible for active-resistance parties.

Table 6: High-minus-Low Wartime Violence Tercile Gaps

Year	Active	Passive	VV	Destroyed
2010	31.182	-0.730	-1.139	0.171
2014	26.981	-2.693	-2.376	0.197
2017	25.719	-2.759	-4.055	0.196
2019	25.929	-3.036	-3.293	0.199
2021	24.443	-1.650	-0.332	0.219
2025	13.443	-1.813	-5.037	0.200

Notes: Each entry reports the difference between settlements in the highest and lowest wartime violence terciles. Vote-share gaps are measured in percentage points. "Destroyed" reports the gap in the destroyed-housing share.

7.5 The Drenica Core

The Drenica core, defined as Skenderaj/Srbica and Gllogovc/Glogovac, is a clear outlier in the descriptive data. Table 7 compares the Drenica core with all other municipalities. In every election year, the Drenica core has much higher active-party support than the rest of the sample. In 2010, active-resistance parties received an average vote share of 93.2 percent in the Drenica core, compared with 42.9 percent in other municipalities. In 2014, the corresponding values were 91.3 and 45.6 percent. Although active-party support declined after 2014, the Drenica core remained strongly aligned with active-resistance parties, with average active-party vote shares of 70.9 percent in 2017, 83.1 percent in 2019, 74.5 percent in 2021, and 80.2 percent in 2025.

The Drenica core also has much higher average wartime victimization. Its mean logged Albanian victimization ranges from 2.815 to 2.918 across election-year samples, compared with roughly 1.47 to 1.55 in other municipalities. This combination of high wartime exposure and exceptionally high support for KLA-linked parties is substantively meaningful given Drenica's central role in the organization and memory of the armed resistance. At the same time, it also shows why the Drenica core must be treated carefully in the empirical analysis: it may partly drive the raw relationship between wartime violence and active-party support.

Figure 5 shows the same contrast visually. The Drenica core remains far above other municipalities in every election year. The gap is especially large in 2010, 2014, 2021, and 2025. Even when active-resistance parties decline nationally, the Drenica core remains

Table 7: Drenica Core vs. Other Municipalities

Year	Variable	Drenica core	Others	Difference
Vote shares				
2010	Active	93.25	42.88	50.37
	Passive	1.65	24.88	-23.23
	VV	1.18	9.77	-8.59
2014	Active	91.29	45.63	45.66
	Passive	2.29	26.23	-23.94
	VV	2.67	10.00	-7.33
2017	Active	70.92	36.43	34.49
	Passive	8.53	26.72	-18.19
	VV	13.46	22.75	-9.29
2019	Active	83.10	40.43	42.67
	Passive	5.05	25.85	-20.80
	VV	8.44	20.19	-11.75
2021	Active	74.47	29.57	44.90
	Passive	2.74	15.07	-12.33
	VV	19.71	43.28	-23.57
2025	Active	80.17	27.38	52.79
	Passive	2.00	17.22	-15.22
	VV	11.72	40.42	-28.70
Violence and demographics				
2010	Log victims	2.82	1.47	1.35
	Destroyed	0.38	0.23	0.15
	Log pop.	7.48	7.32	0.16
2025	Log victims	2.92	1.50	1.42
	Destroyed	0.39	0.12	0.27
	Log pop.	6.92	7.04	-0.12

Notes: Entries are group means. The Drenica core includes Skenderaj/Srbica and Gllogovc/Glogovac. "Active" denotes the vote share of the year-specific active-resistance bloc; "Passive" refers to LDK or its coalition form; "VV" denotes Vetëvendosje. "Log victims" is the log number of Albanian victims per 1,000 residents (2011 baseline). "Destroyed" measures housing destruction. Differences are Drenica minus others.

strongly attached to parties associated with the armed resistance. This reinforces the interpretation of Drenica as a historically distinctive region rather than a typical settlement cluster.



Figure 5: Active-Resistance Vote Share in the Drenica Core and Other Municipalities

7.6 Descriptive Correlations

Table 8 reports pairwise correlations among the main variables in the pooled sample. Active-party vote share is strongly and positively correlated with the main wartime violence measure, with a correlation of 0.432. It is also positively correlated with the alternative 1981-denominator victimization measure, with a correlation of 0.401, and with the destroyed housing share, with a correlation of 0.295. The housing damage index is similarly correlated with active-party support, at 0.320. These raw correlations are consistent with the tercile patterns above: settlements with greater wartime exposure tend to display higher support for active-resistance parties.

By contrast, passive-party support and Vetëvendosje support are only weakly correlated with wartime violence. The correlation between passive-party support and the main violence measure is -0.046, while the correlation between Vetëvendosje support and the main violence measure is -0.051. The main violence measure is also positively correlated with destroyed housing, with a correlation of 0.435, and with the housing damage index, with a correlation of 0.485. The two victimization measures are highly correlated with each other, at 0.814, indicating that the 2011-denominator and 1981-denominator measures

capture similar spatial patterns of wartime exposure.

The correlation matrix also shows that active-party support is negatively correlated with the Serb population share, with a correlation of -0.366, and positively correlated with the 1981 Albanian share, with a correlation of 0.453. Active-party support is negatively correlated with log distance to KLA-related locations, at -0.410, meaning that settlements closer to KLA-related locations tend to display higher active-party support in the raw data. These are descriptive correlations only and do not account for municipality-level differences or other covariates.

Table 8: Correlations among Main Variables

	Active	Passive	VV	Victims	Victims 1981	Destroyed
Active vote share	1.000					
Passive vote share	-0.109	1.000				
VV vote share	-0.300	0.054	1.000			
Log victims	0.432	-0.046	-0.051	1.000		
Log victims, 1981 denom.	0.401	-0.044	-0.022	0.814	1.000	
Destroyed housing share	0.295	0.000	-0.108	0.435	0.375	1.000

Notes: The table reports pairwise correlations in the pooled settlement-election sample. Vote shares are measured in percentage points. "Victims" refers to logged Albanian victims per 1,000 residents using the 2011 population denominator.

7.7 Summary

The descriptive evidence points to a clear empirical pattern. Settlements with higher exposure to wartime violence display higher support for active-resistance parties. This pattern appears in the pooled correlations, in the tercile comparison, and in the contrast between the Drenica core and other municipalities. The relationship is weaker and less consistent for passive-party support and Vetëvendosje support.

At the same time, Kosovo's party system changes substantially over the period covered by the data. Active-resistance parties decline from an average vote share of around 47 to 50 percent in 2010 and 2014 to 31 percent in 2025. Vetëvendosje, by contrast, rises from below 10 percent in 2010 and 2014 to more than 40 percent in 2021 and 38.5 percent in 2025. The Drenica core remains a major historical and electoral outlier throughout the period, with both high wartime victimization and exceptionally high support for KLA-linked parties. These descriptive patterns motivate the regression analysis that follows, where I examine whether the association between wartime violence and active-party support persists after accounting for municipality-level differences and settlement characteristics.

8 Empirical Strategy

8.1 Overview

The empirical analysis examines whether settlements that experienced higher levels of wartime violence subsequently gave greater electoral support to parties associated with active wartime resistance. The main outcome is the active-party vote share, defined as the combined vote share of parties linked to the armed-resistance bloc. I also examine passive-party vote share, proxied by LDK or its year-specific coalition form, and Vetëvendosje vote share as alternative political outcomes. These additional outcomes help assess whether wartime victimization is specifically associated with resistance-linked voting or instead reflects a broader pattern of political difference across settlements.

The empirical strategy proceeds in several complementary steps. First, I document descriptive patterns in violence exposure, housing destruction, and vote shares across settlements and election years. Second, I estimate settlement-level regressions separately by election year with municipality fixed effects. These are the main specifications. Third, I estimate pooled panel models with municipality and election-year fixed effects to summarize the average relationship across elections. Fourth, I estimate year-interaction models to study the persistence and weakening of the victimization-voting relationship over time. Fifth, I report instrumental variables estimates using prewar Serbian settlement geography as supportive evidence, while treating the IV results cautiously because the exclusion restriction is demanding. Sixth, I examine whether the association between wartime victimization and electoral outcomes extends beyond directly affected settlements. Using the spatial distribution of settlements, I compare zero-victim settlements located within 3 kilometres of at least one victimized settlement against zero-victim settlements located further away. This exercise tests whether geographic proximity to violence, rather than direct local exposure, is sufficient to generate the electoral pattern observed in the main results.

8.2 Outcomes and Treatment Variable

The main outcome is the vote share of active-resistance parties in settlement i, municipality m, and election year t. The active bloc is defined using year-specific party configurations. In 2010, it includes PDK and AAK. In 2014, it includes the PDK coalition, AAK, and NISMA. In 2017, it is captured by the PDK-led coalition, since PDK, AAK, and NISMA ran together. In 2019, it includes PDK, the AAK-PSD coalition, and the NISMA-AKR

coalition. In 2021, it includes PDK, AAK, NISMA, and LPB. In 2025, it includes PDK and the AAK-NISMA coalition. This year-specific coding is necessary because Kosovo's party system and electoral coalitions changed substantially between 2010 and 2025.

The two comparison outcomes are passive-party vote share and Vetëvendosje vote share. Passive-party vote share is measured by LDK, except in 2017, when LDK ran with AKR and the LDK-AKR coalition is used. Vetëvendosje vote share is measured by VV, except in 2017, when the party ran under the LV label.

The main historical exposure is local wartime violence. It is measured as the logged number of Albanian victims per 1,000 residents in each settlement:

$$V_i = \log\left(1 + \text{Albanian victims per 1,000 residents}_i\right). \tag{2}$$

This measure captures the intensity of local exposure to wartime violence during the Kosovo War, adjusted for settlement population size. In some specifications, I use the standardized version of this variable, so that coefficients can be interpreted as the change in vote share associated with a one-standard-deviation increase in local victimization. I also report robustness checks using an alternative victimization measure based on the 1981 prewar population denominator and housing destruction measures.

8.3 Main Cross-Sectional Specification

The main specification is estimated separately by election year at the settlement level:

$$Y_{imt} = \alpha_t + \beta_t V_i + \boldsymbol{X}'_{im}\boldsymbol{\gamma}_t + \mu_m + \varepsilon_{imt}, \tag{3}$$

where Y_{imt} is the vote share outcome in settlement i, municipality m, and election year t. The main outcome is active-party vote share. I also estimate the same specification for passive-party vote share and Vetëvendosje vote share. The variable V_i denotes logged Albanian victimization. The vector $\boldsymbol{X}_{im}$ includes settlement-level controls: log population, urban status, and ethnic composition shares. The ethnic controls include the shares of Serbs, Turks, Bosniaks, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians, Gorani, and other ethnic groups. Municipality fixed effects, μ_m, absorb all time-invariant municipality-level characteristics.

The coefficient of interest is β_t. It compares settlements within the same municipality and asks whether more heavily victimized settlements gave higher vote shares to active-resistance parties in a given election year. A positive estimate for active-party vote share would indicate that, within municipalities, more heavily victimized settlements subsequently gave greater electoral support to parties linked to armed resistance. If the

corresponding coefficients for passive-party and Vetëvendosje vote shares are smaller, insignificant, or negative, this would suggest that the relationship is specific to resistance-linked voting rather than a general pattern of political mobilization.

Pooled specifications without municipality fixed effects are also reported in some tables, but they are not the preferred estimates. These models use both within- and between-municipality variation and are more vulnerable to confounding from unobserved municipality-level characteristics. The preferred interpretation is based on the municipality fixed-effects estimates in equation (3).

8.4 Identification Concern

The central identification challenge is that wartime violence was not randomly assigned across settlements. Serbian and Yugoslav forces targeted areas according to military, ethnic, geographic, and strategic considerations. Settlements with higher levels of victimization may therefore have differed before the war in ways that also shaped postwar voting behavior. Potential confounders include prewar nationalist mobilization, local resistance traditions, proximity to KLA networks, terrain, road access, ethnic composition, settlement size, and the strategic importance of particular corridors or mixed areas.

The municipality fixed-effects design addresses part of this concern by comparing settlements within the same municipality. This removes broad municipality-level differences, including the fact that some municipalities, such as those in the Drenica region, had both high wartime violence and unusually strong support for active parties. However, municipality fixed effects do not eliminate all threats to identification. Within the same municipality, more victimized settlements may still differ from less victimized settlements in prewar political organization, local wartime networks, access to roads, terrain, or ethnic geography. For this reason, the main estimates are interpreted as strong conditional associations consistent with the theoretical argument. The instrumental variables analysis is used as supplementary evidence rather than as the sole basis for causal claims.

8.5 Descriptive Spatial Evidence

Before estimating regression models, I document the spatial and descriptive relationship between violence exposure and voting. The descriptive analysis reports summary statistics for active-party, passive-party, and Vetëvendosje vote shares; the distribution of wartime victimization; housing destruction; demographic controls; and prewar ethnic composition where available. I also divide settlements into victimization terciles and compare average

vote shares across low-, medium-, and high-victimization settlements by election year.

This descriptive evidence shows a strong raw relationship between victimization and active-party support. High-victimization settlements have substantially higher active-resistance vote shares than low-victimization settlements across all elections from 2010 to 2025. The Drenica core is also analyzed separately because it combines very high wartime victimization with especially high support for active parties. These descriptive patterns motivate the regression analysis, but they are not interpreted causally.

8.6 Temporal Persistence and Electoral Realignment

The repeated election data allow the analysis to examine whether the electoral legacy of wartime victimization persists over time. I first estimate equation (3) separately for each election year from 2010 to 2025. This produces a sequence of year-specific coefficients, $\hat{\beta}_t$, which show how the victimization-voting relationship changes across elections.

I then estimate a pooled panel specification:

$$Y_{imt} = \alpha + \beta V_i + \boldsymbol{X}'_{im}\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \mu_m + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{imt}, \tag{4}$$

where λ_t denotes election-year fixed effects. This model summarizes the average relationship between wartime victimization and vote shares across repeated elections, while absorbing election-wide shocks common to all settlements. Since wartime victimization is time-invariant, equation (4) identifies β from cross-settlement variation within municipalities, not from within-settlement changes in victimization.

To study the time profile of the relationship more directly, I estimate interaction models of the form:

$$Y_{imt} = \alpha + \sum_t \beta_t \left(V_i \times \mathbb{1}\{t\}\right) + \boldsymbol{X}'_{im}\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \mu_m + \varepsilon_{imt}. \tag{5}$$

The coefficients β_t measure the election-specific slope between wartime victimization and vote share, conditional on controls and municipality fixed effects. Standard errors in the pooled panel and temporal-interaction models are clustered at the settlement level to account for repeated observations of the same settlements across election years.

This specification is useful for distinguishing persistence from electoral realignment. If β_t remains positive across elections, this would indicate a persistent electoral legacy of wartime victimization. If β_t weakens or becomes statistically insignificant in later elections, this would suggest that the political relevance of wartime victimization declined as Kosovo's party system changed.

8.7 Heterogeneity Analysis

To examine whether the relationship between wartime violence and voting differs across settlement types, I estimate interaction models of the form:

$$Y_{imt} = \alpha_t + \beta_{1t} V_i + \beta_{2t} (V_i \times D_i) + \beta_{3t} D_i + \boldsymbol{X}'_{im} \boldsymbol{\gamma}_t + \mu_m + \varepsilon_{imt}, \tag{6}$$

where D_i is a binary settlement characteristic. The coefficient β_{2t} captures whether the victimization slope differs across subgroups. The slope for settlements with $D_i = 0$ is β_{1t}, while the slope for settlements with $D_i = 1$ is $\beta_{1t} + \beta_{2t}$.

The main heterogeneity dimension is election-year heterogeneity, which captures the persistence and weakening of the victimization gradient over time. Additional heterogeneity checks examine rural status, minority composition, and Albanian-majority settlements.

8.8 Matching Robustness Check

As a further robustness check, I estimate matching models that compare settlements with at least one Albanian victim to observationally similar settlements with no recorded Albanian victims. The treatment indicator is defined as

$$T_i = \mathbb{1}\{\text{Albanian victims}_i > 0\}.$$

I estimate a propensity score using pre-treatment and settlement-level covariates, including log population, urban status, ethnic composition, and election-year indicators. I then use nearest-neighbour matching and re-estimate the relationship between direct victimization and vote shares in the matched sample.

The matching exercise is not interpreted as a separate causal identification strategy. Rather, it checks whether the main pattern remains visible after improving balance between victimized and non-victimized settlements on observable characteristics. The post-matching regressions include municipality and election-year fixed effects, and the main outcomes remain active-party, passive-party, and Vetëvendosje vote shares.

8.9 Spatial Spillover Exercise

The main analysis focuses on direct local victimization. I also examine whether the electoral association extends to nearby settlements that did not directly experience recorded Albanian victimization. This exercise is restricted to settlements with zero

recorded Albanian victims. For each election year, I construct an indicator equal to one if a zero-victim settlement is located within a fixed radius of at least one victimized settlement:

$$S_{ir} = \mathbb{1}\{\text{zero-victim settlement } i \text{ has a victimized neighbour within radius } r\},$$

where the main radius is 3 kilometres and 5 kilometres is used as a robustness check.

The spillover specification is:

$$Y_{imt} = \alpha + \theta S_{ir} + \boldsymbol{X}'_{im}\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \mu_m + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{imt}.$$

The coefficient θ compares zero-victim settlements near victimized settlements with zero-victim settlements farther away, within the same municipality and election year structure. This test asks whether proximity to violence is associated with similar electoral patterns even in the absence of direct recorded local victimization. Because nearby settlements may share unobserved wartime networks, geography, or political history, the spillover estimates are interpreted descriptively and as mechanism-oriented evidence rather than as causal estimates.

8.10 Instrumental Variables Motivation

Although the municipality fixed-effects estimates are the main empirical evidence, I also estimate instrumental variables models to address the concern that wartime victimization is endogenous. The purpose of the IV analysis is not to replace the fixed-effects design, but to assess whether the main pattern is consistent with a more causal interpretation.

A valid instrument must satisfy two conditions. First, it must be relevant: it must predict wartime victimization. Second, it must satisfy the exclusion restriction: it must affect postwar vote shares only through wartime victimization, conditional on controls and fixed effects. The second condition is the more demanding one in this setting because historical geography may shape postwar voting through several channels besides wartime victimization.

8.11 Preferred Instrument: Prewar Serbian Settlement Geography

The preferred IV strategy uses prewar Serbian settlement geography as a source of variation in wartime Albanian victimization. The logic is that settlements located near historically

Serbian areas, or surrounded by a stronger prewar Serbian settlement presence, were more exposed to wartime targeting, displacement, and strategic violence. These settlement patterns predate both the 1998–1999 Kosovo War and the postwar party system, which helps rule out reverse causality from postwar voting to the instrument.

I use three Serbian-geography instruments. The first is a spatial lag of prewar Serbian settlement presence, denoted $Z_i^{\text{serb-lag}}$. The second is distance-based exposure to historically Serbian settlements, denoted $Z_i^{\text{dist-serb}}$. The third captures the nearby Serbian settlement environment, denoted $Z_i^{\text{serb-neigh}}$. I also construct a standardized index:

$$Z_i^{\text{SerbIndex}} = z\Big(Z_i^{\text{dist-serb}}\Big) - z\Big(Z_i^{\text{serb-lag}}\Big) - z\Big(Z_i^{\text{serb-neigh}}\Big), \tag{7}$$

where $z(\cdot)$ denotes standardization. The index is signed so that higher values predict greater wartime victimization in the first stage.

The first-stage equation is:

$$V_i = \pi_0 + \pi_1 Z_i + \boldsymbol{X}_{im}'\boldsymbol{\pi} + \mu_m + u_{im}. \tag{8}$$

The second-stage equation is:

$$Y_{imt} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \widehat{V}_i + \boldsymbol{X}_{im}'\boldsymbol{\delta} + \mu_m + \varepsilon_{imt}. \tag{9}$$

The identifying assumption is that, conditional on municipality fixed effects, current settlement controls, and prewar ethnic-composition controls where available, prewar Serbian settlement geography affects postwar active-party support only through wartime Albanian victimization. This assumption is plausible in the sense that the instruments are historically predetermined, but it remains demanding. Prewar Serbian settlement geography may also proxy for displacement, property conflict, postwar ethnic sorting, long-run settlement structure, state presence, roads, or local economic geography. For this reason, I interpret the IV estimates as supportive rather than definitive causal evidence.

8.12 Alternative Victimization Measure and Overidentified IV Models

As an additional robustness check, I use the victimization measure constructed with the 1981 prewar population denominator. This alternative measure scales wartime Albanian victimization by a prewar population baseline, reducing concern that postwar population changes mechanically affect the exposure measure. In the main analysis, the baseline

measure remains logged Albanian victims per 1,000 residents using the postwar census denominator, while the 1981-denominator measure is used to assess whether the results are sensitive to the choice of population denominator.

I also estimate overidentified IV specifications using multiple Serbian-geography instruments simultaneously. These models use the separate components of the Serbian-geography instrument rather than the combined index. They provide additional diagnostic information through overidentification tests. However, they are interpreted cautiously because the different Serbian-geography instruments may capture related but not identical historical mechanisms.

8.13 Supplementary Instruments

In addition to the preferred Serbian-geography instrument, I report supplementary IV specifications using two alternative instruments available in the analysis files.

First, I use logged distance to a KLA-related location. The historical logic is that proximity to KLA-related areas may have predicted exposure to Serbian counter-insurgency violence. However, this instrument has a weaker exclusion restriction than the preferred Serbian-geography instrument because KLA geography may directly affect support for KLA-successor parties through veteran networks, commander legitimacy, local wartime organization, and symbolic identification with armed resistance. I therefore treat the KLA-distance estimates as supplementary evidence rather than as the main source of identification.

Second, I use a terrain-road index, $Z_{\text{tri-road}}$, which combines terrain and road-access geography. Terrain and accessibility are relevant to the geography of insurgency and counter-insurgency, but they may also affect voting through economic development, rural isolation, state capacity, party organization, and settlement structure. These estimates are therefore reported as secondary robustness checks rather than as main causal evidence.

8.14 Instrument Diagnostics and Interpretation

Instrument strength is assessed using the weak-instrument diagnostics reported by `AER::ivreg`, together with manual first-stage F-statistics based on robust first-stage regressions. For overidentified models, I also report Sargan overidentification tests. I do not label these statistics as Kleibergen–Paap or Hansen statistics because those require separate robust implementation.

For the preferred Serbian-geography IV, I also report reduced-form estimates and first-

stage diagnostics. The reduced form regresses active-resistance vote share directly on the Serbian-geography instrument, while the first stage regresses logged Albanian victimization on the same instrument. These diagnostics are reported for the full sample, for the sample excluding the Drenica core, and for the sample excluding the broader conflict region.

The IV coefficient identifies a local average treatment effect for settlements whose wartime victimization is shifted by the instrument. In this setting, the IV estimates should be interpreted as the effect of victimization for settlements whose exposure to violence was affected by prewar Serbian settlement geography. Since the exclusion restriction cannot be tested directly, the IV estimates are used to evaluate whether the main fixed-effects results are consistent with a causal interpretation, not as the sole basis for causal claims.

8.15 Robustness Checks

Several robustness checks are reported. First, I compare pooled OLS and municipality fixed-effects OLS estimates. This distinguishes results driven by cross-municipality variation from those identified within municipalities. Second, I estimate standardized versions of the main specifications so that magnitudes are comparable across election years. Third, I use alternative violence measures, including the 1981 prewar-population denominator and housing destruction measures.

Fourth, I estimate models excluding the Drenica core municipalities, Skenderaj/Srbica and Gllogovc/Glogovac, and then a broader conflict-region exclusion that additionally removes Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, Vushtrri/Vučitrn, Klinë/Klina, and Obiliq/Obilić. These exclusions test whether the results are driven entirely by the geographic heartland of the conflict. Fifth, I conduct leave-one-municipality-out checks, re-estimating the main municipality fixed-effects specification after dropping one municipality at a time. This assesses whether the results depend on any single municipality.

Sixth, I examine whether the victimization relationship appears for active-party vote share but not for passive-party or Vetëvendosje vote shares. This is an important placebo-style comparison because the theory predicts a specific link between wartime victimization and resistance-linked parties, not a general increase in all opposition or non-incumbent voting. Seventh, I report matching-based robustness checks that compare settlements with recorded Albanian victimization to observationally similar non-victimized settlements. Eighth, I examine spatial spillovers among zero-victim settlements located near victimized settlements. Ninth, in the panel analysis, I cluster standard errors at the settlement level to account for repeated observations of the same settlements over time.

8.16 Interpretation

The empirical strategy is deliberately conservative. The main evidence comes from within-municipality comparisons across settlements and from the persistence of the relationship across multiple elections. The results should therefore be interpreted as evidence that settlements with greater Albanian victimization were more likely to support active-resistance parties in the postwar period, conditional on municipality fixed effects and settlement-level controls.

The IV estimates based on prewar Serbian settlement geography provide supportive evidence, especially when the first stage is strong, the reduced form has the expected sign, and the estimates are stable across exclusion samples. However, because the exclusion restriction remains demanding, the IV results are not treated as definitive proof of causality. The supplementary IV estimates using KLA distance and the terrain-road index are reported only as secondary checks because their exclusion restrictions are weaker. The preferred interpretation is that the results are consistent with a persistent electoral legacy of wartime victimization: settlements that suffered greater Albanian victimization were more likely to support active-resistance-linked parties in the postwar period, with the relationship remaining positive through 2021 and weakening sharply in the 2025 election.

9 Results

9.1 Descriptive Evidence and Spatial Patterns

Table 9 reports pooled summary statistics for the main settlement-election sample. The pooled sample contains 3,648 settlement-election observations for the main vote-share outcomes. Across all elections, the average active-resistance vote share is 41.1 percent, compared with 21.3 percent for the passive-party measure and 22.8 percent for Vetëvendosje. The standard deviation of active-party support is 23.8 percentage points, indicating substantial settlement-level variation in support for parties associated with the armed resistance.

The main wartime violence measure, log Albanian victims per 1,000 residents, is available for 3,094 observations. Its mean is 1.64 and its standard deviation is 1.23. The alternative measure using the 1981 denominator has a slightly higher mean of 1.77 and a larger standard deviation of 1.34. Housing destruction is also uneven across settlements: the mean destroyed-housing share is 0.168, while the mean housing damage index is 0.318. The sample is predominantly rural, with an urban-settlement share of only 0.062.

Table 9: Pooled Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Active vote share	3648	41.112	23.831	0.000	98.987
Passive vote share	3648	21.308	14.482	0.000	73.404
Vetëvendosje vote share	3648	22.830	18.454	0.000	88.889
Log Albanian victims per 1,000	3094	1.637	1.230	0.000	5.264
Standardized log victimization	3094	0.000	1.000	-1.331	2.949
Destroyed housing share	3512	0.168	0.195	0.000	1.000
Housing damage index	3512	0.318	0.301	0.000	1.299
Damaged housing share	3512	0.451	0.399	0.000	1.889
Log population	3648	7.100	1.132	0.325	11.887
Urban settlement	3648	0.062	0.241	0.000	1.000
Serb population share	3648	0.044	0.168	0.000	1.000
Bosniak population share	3648	0.023	0.128	0.000	1.000
1981 Albanian share	2718	0.841	0.252	0.000	1.000
1981 Serbian share	2718	0.107	0.195	0.000	1.000
Log Albanian victims per 1,000, 1981 denominator	2718	1.771	1.339	0.000	7.920
Log distance to KLA location	3648	3.580	0.650	-2.303	4.500

Notes: The table reports pooled settlement-election summary statistics. Active vote share refers to the year-specific bloc of parties associated with active wartime resistance. Passive vote share refers to LDK or its year-specific coalition form. Wartime violence is measured as log Albanian victims per 1,000 residents.

Table 10 shows how vote shares changed over time. Active parties were strongest in the early postwar elections, with average vote shares of 47.2 percent in 2010 and 49.6 percent

in 2014. Their support then declined to 39.4 percent in 2017, recovered partly to 44.1 percent in 2019, and fell to 33.8 percent in 2021 and 31.0 percent in 2025. Vetëvendosje follows the opposite pattern: its average vote share increased from below 10 percent in 2010 and 2014 to 41.1 percent in 2021 and 38.5 percent in 2025. Passive-party support was relatively stable from 2010 to 2019, before falling sharply in 2021 and partially recovering in 2025.

Table 10: Outcome Trends by Election Year

Year	N	Active mean	Active SD	Passive mean	Passive SD	VV mean
2010	562	47.180	26.120	22.900	16.100	9.040
2014	601	49.580	24.860	24.160	15.700	9.370
2017	681	39.420	21.730	25.140	14.200	21.950
2019	696	44.110	22.740	24.060	14.400	19.170
2021	640	33.780	21.200	13.920	9.880	41.070
2025	468	30.990	20.480	16.180	11.200	38.460

Notes: The table reports mean settlement-level vote shares by election year. Active vote share refers to the year-specific active-resistance party bloc. Passive vote share refers to LDK or its year-specific coalition form. VV refers to Vetëvendosje.

The descriptive correlations in Table 11 show a strong raw relationship between wartime exposure and active-party support. Active vote share is positively correlated with log Albanian victimization, with a correlation of 0.432. It is also positively correlated with the 1981-denominator victimization measure, destroyed housing share, and the broader housing damage index. By contrast, passive-party and Vetëvendosje vote shares are weakly or negatively correlated with wartime victimization.

Table 11: Selected Pairwise Correlations

Variable	Active	Passive	VV
Log victims per 1,000	0.432	-0.046	-0.051
Log victims per 1,000, 1981 denom.	0.401	-0.044	-0.022
Destroyed housing share	0.295	0.000	-0.108
Housing damage index	0.320	0.013	-0.109
Serb population share	-0.366	-0.278	-0.211
1981 Albanian share	0.453	0.252	0.132
1981 Serbian share	-0.333	-0.144	-0.021
Log distance to KLA location	-0.410	0.204	0.089

Notes: The table reports pairwise correlations using available observations. Active, passive, and VV refer to settlement-level vote shares for the active-resistance bloc, LDK/passive-resistance bloc, and Vetëvendosje, respectively. These correlations are descriptive and do not condition on controls or municipality fixed effects.

Figure 6 illustrates the geographic distribution of wartime violence and active-party vote share across Kosovo. A pronounced spatial correspondence is visible. The Drenica core,

especially Skenderaj/Srbica and Gllogovc/Glogovac, stands out as the area with both high victimization intensity and exceptionally high active-party support. The map motivates the within-municipality design because it shows that raw spatial patterns may partly reflect regional history, wartime organization, and local political traditions.



Figure 6: Geographic distribution of wartime violence and active-party vote share. The choropleth shading shows active-party vote share at the settlement level. Overlaid bubbles represent log Albanian victims per 1,000 residents. Northern Serb-majority municipalities excluded from the analysis are shown in grey.

9.2 Vote Shares by Wartime Violence Tercile

Table 12 reports average vote shares by settlement-level victimization tercile. The terciles are defined once at the settlement level and then applied to all election years. This keeps the classification fixed over time.

The pattern is clear. In every election year, active-party support is highest in the high-victimization tercile and lowest in the low-victimization tercile. In 2010, the active-party vote share was 62.3 percent in the high-victimization tercile, compared with 31.1 percent in the low-victimization tercile. In 2014, the corresponding values were 62.5 and 35.5 percent.

The gap remains visible in 2017, 2019, and 2021. By 2025, the high-low gap narrows, but the ordering remains: active-party support is 40.9 percent in the high-victimization tercile and 27.4 percent in the low-victimization tercile.

Table 12: Vote Shares by Settlement-Level Wartime Violence Tercile

Year	Violence group	N	Mean violence	Active mean	Passive mean	VV mean
2010	Low	198	0.267	31.100	21.400	8.950
2010	Medium	185	1.580	49.700	26.600	10.300
2010	High	179	3.050	62.300	20.700	7.820
2014	Low	177	0.296	35.500	24.000	10.400
2014	Medium	187	1.590	51.500	28.100	9.370
2014	High	182	3.050	62.500	21.300	8.000
2017	Low	179	0.304	26.000	25.600	23.700
2017	Medium	185	1.580	41.100	28.200	22.700
2017	High	186	3.060	51.700	22.800	19.600
2019	Low	177	0.309	31.700	24.500	20.000
2019	Medium	183	1.580	45.400	27.500	20.800
2019	High	183	3.050	57.600	21.500	16.700
2021	Low	177	0.296	21.700	13.600	38.100
2021	Medium	170	1.580	33.000	15.600	44.600
2021	High	171	3.060	46.200	12.000	37.800
2025	Low	123	0.311	27.400	15.900	39.900
2025	Medium	137	1.570	30.800	19.500	41.900
2025	High	115	3.060	40.900	14.100	34.900

Notes: Wartime violence is measured as log Albanian victims per 1,000 residents. Terciles are defined once at the settlement level and then applied to all election years.

Table 13 summarizes the high-minus-low tercile gaps. The active-party gap is positive in every election year. It is largest in 2010, at 31.2 percentage points, and remains large through 2021. In 2025, the gap falls to 13.4 percentage points, consistent with the weakening of the victimization gradient in the most recent election.

Table 13: High-Minus-Low Wartime Violence Tercile Gaps

Year	Active gap	Passive gap	VV gap	Destroyed-housing gap
2010	31.200	-0.730	-1.130	0.171
2014	27.000	-2.690	-2.380	0.197
2017	25.700	-2.760	-4.070	0.196
2019	25.900	-3.040	-3.290	0.199
2021	24.400	-1.650	-0.330	0.219
2025	13.400	-1.810	-5.040	0.200

Notes: Values report the difference between the high-victimization and low-victimization terciles. Positive values indicate that the high-victimization tercile has a higher average value.

9.3 Main Within-Municipality Evidence

Table 14 reports the main municipality fixed-effects estimates. The dependent variable is active-party vote share. The coefficient on log Albanian victims per 1,000 residents is positive and statistically significant from 2010 through 2021. In 2010, a one-unit increase in logged victimization is associated with a 2.87 percentage point increase in active-party vote share within the same municipality. The coefficient remains positive in 2014, 2017, 2019, and 2021. In 2025, however, the coefficient becomes negative and statistically insignificant.

Table 14: Year-Specific Municipality Fixed-Effects Estimates

	2010	2014	2017	2019	2021	2025
Panel A: Active vote share						
Log victims per 1,000	2.874***	1.664**	1.843***	2.231***	1.891***	-0.782
	(0.871)	(0.818)	(0.554)	(0.649)	(0.656)	(0.757)
Panel B: Passive vote share						
Log victims per 1,000	-0.476	-0.230	0.062	-0.457	-0.070	-0.286
	(0.491)	(0.506)	(0.453)	(0.473)	(0.352)	(0.407)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	562	546	550	543	518	375

Notes: The table reports year-specific estimates from municipality fixed-effects regressions. The treatment variable is logged Albanian victims per 1,000 residents. Dependent variables are settlement-level vote shares measured in percentage points. All specifications include log population, urban status, ethnic-composition controls, and municipality fixed effects. Robust HC1 standard errors are reported in parentheses.
$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

The standardized estimates in Table 15 make the magnitude comparable across years. A one-standard-deviation increase in log victimization is associated with a 3.57 percentage point increase in active-party vote share in 2010, 2.04 points in 2014, 2.27 points in 2017, 2.74 points in 2019, and 2.35 points in 2021. The 2025 estimate is negative and statistically insignificant. This pattern is consistent with a persistent but weakening electoral legacy of wartime victimization.

The passive-party coefficients are small and generally insignificant. This strengthens the interpretation that the relationship is specific to parties associated with active wartime resistance rather than a general relationship between victimization and all major party blocs. These results provide only weak support for Hypothesis 2. While the passive-party coefficients are consistently negative in direction, they do not reach statistical significance in any individual election year, and the pooled panel estimate of -0.637 in Table 17, though significant at the 5 percent level, is modest in magnitude. The evidence therefore suggests

Table 15: Year-Specific Municipality Fixed-Effects Estimates, Standardized Victimization

	2010	2014	2017	2019	2021	2025
Panel A: Active vote share						
Standardized log victims	3.574***	2.042**	2.274***	2.738***	2.346***	-0.941
	(1.083)	(1.004)	(0.683)	(0.797)	(0.814)	(0.912)
Panel B: Passive vote share						
Standardized log victims	-0.592	-0.283	0.076	-0.561	-0.087	-0.344
	(0.611)	(0.621)	(0.559)	(0.580)	(0.437)	(0.490)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	562	546	550	543	518	375

Notes: The table reports year-specific estimates from municipality fixed-effects regressions. The treatment variable is standardized logged Albanian victimization, so each coefficient gives the percentage-point change in the vote-share outcome associated with a one-standard-deviation increase in logged victimization. Dependent variables are settlement-level vote shares measured in percentage points. All specifications include log population, urban status, ethnic-composition controls, and municipality fixed effects. Robust HC1 standard errors are reported in parentheses.
$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

that wartime victimization did not systematically reduce passive-party support within municipalities, even as it consistently increased active-party support.

9.4 Housing Destruction Robustness

Table 16 reports results using the destroyed-housing share as an alternative exposure proxy. In pooled OLS, destroyed housing is strongly and positively associated with active-party vote share in every election year. The pooled coefficients range from 18.6 to 29.2. After municipality fixed effects are included, the estimates are smaller. They remain statistically significant in 2017, 2019, and 2021, but not in 2010, 2014, or 2025.

These results provide partial support for the main victimization finding. Housing destruction is clearly correlated with active-party voting in pooled comparisons. However, the within-municipality evidence is less stable than the evidence based on log Albanian victimization. This suggests that the destroyed-housing measure captures an important dimension of wartime exposure, but part of its explanatory power comes from between-municipality differences in conflict intensity and political history.

9.5 Panel Evidence and Temporal Decay

Table 17 reports pooled panel estimates using municipality fixed effects and election-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the settlement level. The estimation sample

Table 16: Housing Destruction and Active-Resistance Vote Share

	2010	2014	2017	2019	2021	2025
Panel A: Pooled OLS						
Destroyed housing share	29.212***	19.319***	18.602***	21.464***	24.908***	23.855***
	(6.237)	(4.972)	(4.057)	(4.229)	(4.433)	(7.026)
Panel B: Municipality fixed effects						
Destroyed housing share	6.353	4.876	7.988***	6.339**	6.159**	1.014
	(4.333)	(3.974)	(2.797)	(2.623)	(2.553)	(4.825)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality FE, Panel A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Municipality FE, Panel B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	426	601	681	696	640	468

Notes: The dependent variable is active-resistance vote share, measured in percentage points. The exposure variable is the share of assessed housing units classified as destroyed. Panel A reports pooled OLS estimates. Panel B reports specifications with municipality fixed effects. All regressions include the standard settlement-level controls: log population, urban status, and ethnic-composition controls. Robust HC1 standard errors are reported in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

is restricted to the 1,688 settlement-year observations with non-missing victimization data, representing 418 fewer observations than the full balanced panel of 2,106. The attrition reflects settlements for which the killings database records no match, not genuine absence of conflict exposure, and is distributed across election years rather than concentrated in any single year.

The coefficient on standardized victimization is 1.83 for active-party vote share and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This means that, across the panel, a one-standard-deviation increase in settlement-level victimization is associated with a 1.83 percentage point higher active-party vote share, conditional on controls, municipality fixed effects, and year fixed effects.

The coefficient is negative for passive-party vote share and Vetëvendosje vote share. The passive-party estimate is -0.64 and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The Vetëvendosje estimate is -0.59 and marginally significant at the 10 percent level. This reinforces the interpretation that the positive victimization gradient is specific to active-resistance parties.

Table 18 reports the temporal-interaction estimates for active-party vote share. The victimization slope is positive and statistically significant from 2014 through 2021. It is largest in 2014, at 3.08 percentage points per standard deviation of victimization. The slope remains positive in 2017, 2019, and 2021. In 2025, the coefficient becomes negative and statistically insignificant. This is the clearest evidence of temporal weakening: wartime victimization continues to predict active-party support through 2021, but the relationship

Table 17: Pooled Panel Estimates with Municipality and Year Fixed Effects

	Active vote share	Passive vote share	VV vote share
Standardized log victims	1.834***	-0.637**	-0.587*
	(0.438)	(0.301)	(0.325)
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,688	1,688	1,688

Notes: The table reports pooled settlement-year panel estimates. Dependent variables are settlement-level vote shares measured in percentage points. The treatment variable is standardized logged Albanian victimization, so each coefficient gives the percentage-point change in the outcome associated with a one-standard-deviation increase in logged victimization. All specifications include municipality fixed effects, election-year fixed effects, and the standard control set. Standard errors are clustered at the settlement level and reported in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

no longer appears in 2025.

Table 18: Temporal Decay in the Victimization-Active Vote Relationship

Election year	Coefficient	SE	95% CI
2014	3.077***	0.807	[1.496, 4.659]
2017	1.873**	0.738	[0.426, 3.320]
2019	2.027***	0.694	[0.668, 3.387]
2021	2.623***	0.597	[1.453, 3.793]
2025	-0.396	0.857	[-2.076, 1.284]

Notes: The dependent variable is active-resistance vote share, measured in percentage points. Each coefficient represents the absolute year-specific association between standardized victimization and active-resistance vote share, recovered by summing the 2010 base slope and the year-specific interaction term. The 2010 slope is omitted from the table as it is already reported in Table 15. The model includes the standard control set and municipality fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the settlement level.
$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

9.6 The Role of Drenica and Geographic Robustness

The Drenica core is historically central to the Kosovo War and to the political identity of the armed resistance. For this reason, it is important to examine whether the main results are driven entirely by Skenderaj/Srbica and Gllogovc/Glogovac. The exclusion checks show that this is not the case. When the Drenica core is excluded, the municipality fixed-effects estimates remain positive through 2021. When the broader conflict region is excluded, the coefficients are smaller, and some lose statistical significance, but the

estimates remain positive from 2010 through 2021.

The leave-one-municipality-out results in Table 19 provide a more systematic robustness check. In every year from 2010 through 2021, the coefficient on victimization remains positive no matter which municipality is dropped. The median leave-one-out estimate is 2.88 in 2010, 1.66 in 2014, 1.84 in 2017, 2.23 in 2019, and 1.92 in 2021. In 2025, all leave-one-out estimates are negative, confirming that the weakening in 2025 is not driven by a single municipality.

Table 19: Leave-One-Municipality-Out Robustness Check

Year	Min. coef.	Median coef.	Max. coef.	Positive (%)	Significant at 5% (%)
2010	2.410	2.880	3.240	100	100
2014	1.210	1.660	2.110	100	50
2017	1.470	1.840	2.120	100	100
2019	1.900	2.230	2.470	100	100
2021	1.470	1.920	2.210	100	100
2025	-1.050	-0.782	-0.200	0	0

Notes: Each row summarizes coefficients from re-estimating the main municipality fixed-effects specification after dropping one municipality at a time. The dependent variable is active-resistance vote share, measured in percentage points. The treatment variable is logged Albanian victims per 1,000 residents. "Positive" reports the share of leave-one-out estimates greater than zero. "Significant at 5%" reports the share of leave-one-out estimates statistically significant at the 5% level.

9.7 Instrumental Variables Evidence

Table 20 reports instrumental variables estimates using the preferred Serbian-geography index as the excluded instrument. The IV results should be interpreted cautiously because the exclusion restriction remains demanding. Nevertheless, the estimates are consistent with the main fixed-effects pattern. In the full sample, the 2SLS coefficient is positive and statistically significant from 2010 through 2021. The estimates remain positive when the Drenica core is excluded and when the broader conflict region is excluded, although the broader exclusion weakens the estimates in some years. In 2025, the IV estimates are negative and statistically insignificant, matching the weakening observed in the OLS results.

The IV estimates are larger than the corresponding OLS estimates. This may reflect a local average treatment effect for settlements whose victimization was shifted by prewar Serbian settlement geography. It may also reflect remaining exclusion-restriction concerns, since Serbian settlement geography could affect voting through channels other than wartime victimization, such as displacement, property conflict, postwar ethnic sorting, or long-run

Table 20: Serbian-Geography IV Estimates under Drenica Exclusions

Sample	2010	2014	2017	2019	2021	2025
Full sample	12.569***	9.751***	9.776***	8.988***	8.325***	-2.577
	(4.014)	(3.565)	(3.089)	(3.270)	(2.980)	(2.872)
Excl. Drenica core	12.936***	9.810**	11.617***	8.943**	8.118**	-4.295
	(4.698)	(4.088)	(3.940)	(3.717)	(3.302)	(4.159)
Excl. broader conflict region	8.924**	6.309	9.585**	6.787*	5.471*	-2.315
	(4.296)	(3.884)	(3.902)	(3.671)	(2.999)	(5.328)
Observations						
Full sample	494	492	486	465	458	317
Excl. Drenica core	447	445	439	422	415	288
Excl. broader conflict region	382	380	375	362	354	243

Notes: The table reports 2SLS estimates. The dependent variable is active-resistance vote share, measured in percentage points. The endogenous variable is logged Albanian victims per 1,000 residents. The excluded instrument is the preferred Serbian-geography instrument. All specifications include the full control set and municipality fixed effects. "Excl. Drenica core" drops Skenderaj/Srbica and Gllogovc/Glogovac. "Excl. broader conflict region" additionally drops adjacent conflict-region municipalities. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

settlement structure. For this reason, the IV results are best read as supportive evidence rather than definitive causal proof.

9.8 Spatial Spillovers from Nearby Victimization

The baseline results examine whether direct exposure to wartime violence is associated with post-conflict electoral outcomes. As outlined in the empirical strategy, a related question is whether this relationship extends beyond directly affected electoral units. I therefore examine whether nearby violence is associated with voting behavior in electoral units that did not directly record Albanian victims.

For this exercise, I restrict the sample to electoral units with zero recorded Albanian victims. I define a spillover-exposed electoral unit as one located within 3 kilometers of at least one electoral unit with positive Albanian victimization. The 3 kilometer radius is used as the main definition, while a 5 kilometer radius is used as a robustness check. A 10 kilometer radius is not used as a main specification because almost all zero-victim electoral units become classified as exposed at that distance.

The estimating equation is:

$$Y_{imt} = \alpha + \beta Spillover_{imt} + \mathbf{X}'_{imt}\gamma + \mu_m + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{imt}, \tag{10}$$

where Y_{imt} is the vote share of active, passive, or VV parties in electoral unit i, municipality m, and election year t. The variable $Spillover_{imt}$ equals one if the unit had zero recorded Albanian victims but was located within the relevant radius of at least one victimized electoral unit. The vector $\mathbf{X}_{imt}$ includes census controls, μ_m denotes municipality fixed effects, and λ_t denotes election-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Table 21 first reports descriptive differences using the 3 kilometer definition. The raw differences suggest a strong positive association between nearby victimization and active-party support. For example, in 2019, zero-victim electoral units not located near victimized units had an average active-party vote share of 18.9 percent, compared with 38.7 percent among zero-victim electoral units located within 3 kilometers of a victimized unit. Similar raw differences appear in 2014, 2017, and 2021, while the difference is much smaller in 2025.

Table 21: Descriptive Spillover Patterns among Zero-Victim Electoral Units, 3 km Radius

	No spillover exposure			Spillover exposure		
Year	Obs.	Active	Passive	Obs.	Active	Passive
2014	58	21.3	10.5	122	38.1	20.9
2017	63	13.9	13.4	198	33.2	23.6
2019	64	18.9	11.8	211	38.7	23.1
2021	56	13.9	8.1	175	31.1	14.6
2025	51	20.7	12.6	117	24.4	14.3

Notes: The table reports descriptive means among zero-victim electoral units. Spillover exposure equals one if the unit is located within 3 km of a victimized electoral unit. Active and passive vote shares are measured in percentage points. The table is descriptive and does not condition on controls or fixed effects.

The descriptive comparison, however, does not account for municipality-level differences or local demographic composition. Table 22 therefore reports year-specific regressions for active-party vote share using the 3 kilometer definition, including municipality fixed effects and census controls. The estimates are negative in all years. The 2014 coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, while the 2017 coefficient is significant only at the 10 percent level. The coefficients for 2019, 2021, and 2025 are statistically insignificant.

Table 22: Spillover effects on active-party vote share among zero-victim electoral units, 3 km radius

	2014	2017	2019	2021	2025
Spillover exposure, 3 km	-6.776**	-4.120*	-1.173	-2.439	-1.317
	(2.995)	(2.073)	(2.627)	(2.077)	(3.701)
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Census controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	160	241	255	219	160
Within R^2	0.638	0.541	0.527	0.476	0.300

Notes: The sample is restricted to electoral units with zero recorded Albanian victims. Spillover exposure equals one if the electoral unit is located within 3 kilometers of at least one electoral unit with positive Albanian victimization. All models include municipality fixed effects and census controls. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table 23 reports pooled estimates across election years. These models include municipality fixed effects, election-year fixed effects, and census controls. For active-party vote share, the main 3 kilometer coefficient is -1.735, with a standard error of 2.129, and is statistically insignificant. The 5 kilometer robustness specification is also negative and statistically insignificant. Thus, the pooled estimates do not support a positive active-party spillover effect.

For passive-party vote share, the 3 kilometer coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. However, this result is not robust to the 5 kilometer definition. For VV vote share, neither the 3 kilometer nor the 5 kilometer spillover coefficient is statistically significant.

As an additional check, I replace the binary spillover indicator with an intensity measure: the log number of Albanian victims in nearby electoral units. Table 24 shows that the intensity measure is not statistically significant for active-party vote share, passive-party vote share, or VV vote share. This holds for both the 3 kilometer and 5 kilometer definitions.

Overall, the spillover results do not provide robust evidence that proximity to victimized electoral units increased support for active-resistance parties among units with no direct Albanian victimization. The raw descriptive differences are large and positive, but they disappear after controlling for municipality fixed effects and census characteristics. In the pooled models, the active-party spillover coefficients are negative and statistically insignificant under both the 3 kilometer and 5 kilometer definitions.

Table 23: Pooled Spillover Estimates among Zero-Victim Electoral Units

	3 km radius			5 km radius		
	Active	Passive	VV	Active	Passive	VV
Spillover exposure	-1.735	1.892*	1.286	-3.070	-0.740	-0.207
	(2.129)	(0.996)	(3.056)	(2.835)	(2.052)	(0.596)
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Census controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050
Within R^2	0.360	0.333	0.178	0.361	0.331	0.177

Notes: The sample is restricted to electoral units with zero recorded Albanian victims. Spillover exposure equals one if the electoral unit is located within the relevant radius of at least one electoral unit with positive Albanian victimization. Dependent variables are settlement-level vote shares measured in percentage points. All models include municipality fixed effects, election-year fixed effects, and census controls. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses.
$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 24: Spillover Intensity and Vote Shares among Zero-Victim Electoral Units

	3 km radius			5 km radius		
	Active	Passive	VV	Active	Passive	VV
Log nearby victims	0.687	0.037	0.350	-0.419	-0.208	0.322
	(1.180)	(0.312)	(0.788)	(1.234)	(0.434)	(0.547)
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Census controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050
Within R^2	0.360	0.331	0.178	0.359	0.331	0.178

Notes: The sample is restricted to electoral units with zero recorded Albanian victims. The treatment variable is $\log(1 + \text{nearby Albanian victims})$, where nearby victims are summed across electoral units within the relevant radius. Dependent variables are settlement-level vote shares measured in percentage points. All models include municipality fixed effects, election-year fixed effects, and census controls. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses.
$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

The passive-party results are more mixed. The pooled 3 kilometer coefficient is positive and significant only at the 10 percent level, and this result does not survive the 5 kilometer robustness check. The VV estimates also show no stable spillover pattern. Taken together, these findings suggest that the electoral legacy of wartime violence is more closely tied to direct local exposure than to simple geographic proximity to violence.

9.9 Heterogeneity in the Victimization Effect

The baseline estimates pool all election years and impose a common association between wartime victimization and electoral outcomes. This may hide important variation across elections or across local contexts. I therefore examine whether the relationship between Albanian victimization and vote shares differs over time and across selected local characteristics.

The heterogeneity analysis focuses primarily on election-year heterogeneity. This is the most informative specification because the political meaning of active-resistance parties, passive parties, and Vetëvendosje changed across elections. I estimate models that interact log Albanian victims per capita with election-year indicators, while keeping municipality fixed effects, election-year fixed effects, and the same census controls used in the baseline models. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

The estimated specification is:

$$Y_{imt} = \alpha + \sum_{t} \beta_t \left(\lambda_t \times \log(1 + \text{Albanian victims per 1,000}_i)\right) + \mathbf{X}'_{imt}\gamma + \mu_m + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{imt}, \quad (11)$$

where Y_{imt} is the vote share of active parties, passive parties, or Vetëvendosje in electoral unit i, municipality m, and election year t. The interaction terms allow the association between victimization and vote shares to vary across election years. The 2010 interaction is omitted because of collinearity, so the table reports the estimated slopes for the non-omitted election years.

Table 25 reports the year-specific victimization estimates. For active-party vote share, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant in 2014, 2017, 2019, and 2021. The largest estimated association appears in 2014: a one-unit increase in logged Albanian victims per 1,000 inhabitants is associated with a 2.25 percentage-point higher active-party vote share. The association remains positive in 2017, 2019, and 2021, with estimated effects of 1.24, 1.74, and 1.03 percentage points, respectively. By 2025, the estimated coefficient becomes negative and statistically insignificant. This pattern suggests that the association between wartime victimization and support for active-resistance parties was

present across several postwar elections, but had weakened by 2025.

The alternative outcomes show a weaker and more selective pattern. Albanian victimization is not systematically associated with passive-party vote share in most election years, although the 2025 coefficient is negative and weakly significant. For Vetëvendosje, the only clearly significant estimate appears in 2019, where higher Albanian victimization is associated with a 0.61 percentage-point lower VV vote share. Overall, the year-specific estimates suggest that victimization was most consistently associated with support for active-resistance parties, rather than with passive-party or Vetëvendosje vote shares.

Table 25: Year-Specific Victimization Interactions and Vote Shares

	Active vote share	Passive vote share	VV vote share
2014 × Log victims	2.246***	-0.006	-0.645
	(0.775)	(0.622)	(0.683)
2017 × Log victims	1.237**	0.001	-0.473
	(0.542)	(0.372)	(0.345)
2019 × Log victims	1.740***	-0.251	-0.607**
	(0.403)	(0.386)	(0.250)
2021 × Log victims	1.028**	-0.106	-0.065
	(0.484)	(0.362)	(0.610)
2025 × Log victims	-0.415	-0.688*	0.062
	(0.983)	(0.375)	(0.850)
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Census controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,173	3,173	3,173
Within R^2	0.275	0.227	0.151

Notes: The dependent variables are settlement-level vote shares measured in percentage points. "Log victims" refers to logged Albanian victims per 1,000 inhabitants. The table reports interactions between election-year indicators and logged Albanian victims. The 2010 interaction is omitted because of collinearity. All models include municipality fixed effects, election-year fixed effects, and census controls. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses.
$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

I also examine whether the victimization effect differs by rural status, minority composition, and broader election timing. Table 26 reports these tests for active-party vote share. The baseline pooled coefficient is positive and statistically significant: a one-unit increase in logged Albanian victims per 1,000 inhabitants is associated with a 1.21 percentage-point higher active-party vote share.

The rural specification compares urban and rural settlements. The coefficient on logged victimization is negative and statistically insignificant for urban settlements, while the interaction with rural status is positive but also statistically insignificant. The implied

marginal effect among rural settlements is positive and statistically significant: $-0.598 + 1.825 = 1.227$, with a standard error of 0.378. This suggests that the positive association between victimization and active-party vote share is visible among rural settlements. However, because the interaction term itself is not statistically significant, the model does not provide strong evidence that the victimization effect is statistically different between rural and urban settlements.

The low-minority specification examines whether the relationship differs between settlements with relatively low and relatively high minority shares. The coefficient on logged victimization is positive and statistically significant for the reference group, namely settlements with above-median minority shares. The interaction with the low-minority indicator is negative but statistically insignificant. This means that the estimated victimization coefficient is numerically smaller in low-minority settlements, but the difference is not precisely estimated. The positive coefficient on the low-minority indicator itself indicates that low-minority settlements have higher active-party vote shares on average, conditional on the controls and fixed effects. However, this is a level difference in active-party support, not evidence that victimization has a stronger effect in low-minority settlements.

Finally, the post-2019 interaction is negative but statistically insignificant. The implied coefficient is smaller after 2019, but the pooled pre/post difference is not precisely estimated in this specification. This result is consistent with the year-specific estimates, which show that the victimization-active vote association remains positive through 2021 but is no longer visible in 2025.

Taken together, the heterogeneity results suggest that the association between wartime victimization and electoral outcomes is not constant across elections. The positive relationship between Albanian victimization and active-party vote share is visible in 2014, 2017, 2019, and 2021, but disappears by 2025. This pattern is consistent with the idea that wartime victimization remained electorally relevant for active-resistance parties for much of the postwar period, while becoming weaker after the broader party-system realignment of the 2020s. The contextual heterogeneity tests provide weaker evidence. The rural marginal effect is positive, but the rural interaction itself is not statistically significant. Similarly, the low-minority and post-2019 interactions do not provide strong evidence of systematic heterogeneity. I therefore interpret the heterogeneity evidence as primarily temporal rather than demographic or spatial.

Table 26: Contextual Heterogeneity in the Victimization-Active Vote Relationship

	Baseline	Rural	Low-minority	Post-2019
Log victims	1.206***	-0.598	1.677**	1.651***
	(0.378)	(1.602)	(0.616)	(0.495)
Log victims × Rural		1.825		
		(1.593)		
Log victims × Low-minority			-0.763	
			(0.622)	
Log victims × Post-2019				-0.716
				(0.522)
Rural		-0.079		
		(1.627)		
Low-minority			4.702***	
			(1.342)	
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Census controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,173	3,173	3,173	3,173
Within R^2	0.268	0.269	0.278	0.269

Notes: The dependent variable is active-resistance vote share, measured in percentage points. "Log victims" refers to logged Albanian victims per 1,000 inhabitants. Each interaction model tests whether the association between victimization and active-party vote share differs across the indicated contextual dimension. All specifications include municipality fixed effects, election-year fixed effects, and census controls. In the rural specification, the urban indicator is omitted because of collinearity. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses.
$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

9.10 Matching Robustness Check

As an additional robustness check, I use propensity score matching to compare electoral units with recorded Albanian victimization to observationally similar units without recorded Albanian victimization. The treatment is a binary indicator equal to one if an electoral unit recorded at least one Albanian victim. Units are matched on population size, urban status, ethnic composition, and election-year indicators. After matching, I estimate the association between victimization and vote shares using the matched sample, municipality fixed effects, election-year fixed effects, and weights from the matching procedure.

This exercise should not be interpreted as identifying a causal effect under weaker assumptions than the main fixed-effects models. Matching can only improve comparability on observed characteristics. Unobserved differences between victimized and non-victimized units may remain. The exercise is therefore used as a robustness check for whether the main association is driven by observable differences in population size, ethnic composition, or urban status.

The matching procedure substantially improves covariate balance. Before matching, treated and control units differed strongly in population size and ethnic composition, especially Serb and Goran population shares. After matching, most standardized mean differences fall below 0.1. However, some imbalance remains: log population, Serb share, and Bosniak share remain above the conventional 0.1 threshold. The balance diagnostics therefore indicate improved but not perfect comparability between treated and control units.

Table 27: Matched-Sample Mean Vote Shares by Victimization Status

Victimization status	Observations	Active	Passive	VV
No Albanian victims	833	35.2	21.0	27.1
At least one Albanian victim	833	41.7	21.7	25.5
Difference		6.5	0.7	-1.6

Notes: The table reports mean settlement-level vote shares in the matched sample. Vote shares are measured in percentage points. The treatment indicator equals one if the electoral unit recorded at least one Albanian victim. Matching is based on population size, urban status, ethnic composition, and election-year indicators. VV refers to Vetëvendosje.

Table 28 reports the matched regression results. In the matched sample, victimized electoral units have active-party vote shares that are 2.167 percentage points higher than comparable non-victimized units, conditional on municipality and election-year fixed effects. This estimate is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. After adding the

full set of census controls, the coefficient remains positive at 2.273 percentage points, although it is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level.

The matched estimates for passive-party vote share and VV vote share are small and statistically insignificant. This suggests that the matching evidence is mainly consistent with a positive association between Albanian victimization and active-party support, rather than with a broad increase or decrease across all political alternatives.

Table 28: Matching Estimates of Albanian Victimization and Vote Shares

	Without census controls			With census controls		
	Active	Passive	VV	Active	Passive	VV
At least one Albanian victim	2.167**	0.451	-0.746	2.273*	0.478	-0.991
	(0.865)	(0.966)	(0.722)	(1.172)	(0.932)	(0.791)
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Census controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,666	1,666	1,666	1,666	1,666	1,666
R^2	0.619	0.500	0.664	0.701	0.579	0.707
Within R^2	0.005	0.000	0.001	0.217	0.159	0.129

Notes: The treatment variable equals one if the electoral unit recorded at least one Albanian victim. Dependent variables are settlement-level vote shares measured in percentage points. The matched sample contains 833 treated and 833 control observations. All regressions use matching weights. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses. VV refers to Vetëvendosje.
$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

I also estimate the matched model separately by election year for active-party vote share. The results are shown in Table 29. The matched effect is positive in every election year, but it is statistically significant only at the 10 percent level in 2017, 2019, and 2021. The coefficient is smaller and statistically insignificant in 2025. This pattern suggests that the positive association between victimization and active-party support is not driven by a single election, although the evidence is stronger in the middle elections than in the final year of the sample.

Table 29: Matched estimates by election year: active-party vote share

	2014	2017	2019	2021	2025
At least one Albanian victim	2.138	2.396*	2.489*	2.522*	0.234
	(2.929)	(1.352)	(1.294)	(1.232)	(1.604)
Municipality fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Census controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	275	384	387	350	258
Within R^2	0.431	0.326	0.355	0.282	0.094

Notes: The dependent variable is active-party vote share. The treatment variable equals one if the electoral unit recorded at least one Albanian victim. All regressions use the matched sample and matching weights. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Overall, the matching exercise supports the main interpretation of the paper. Even after matching victimized and non-victimized electoral units on observable characteristics, victimized units display higher active-party vote shares. The effect is modest in magnitude, around 2 percentage points, and becomes weaker after adding controls, but it remains positive. At the same time, the balance diagnostics show that matching does not fully eliminate all observable differences between treated and control units. The matching results should therefore be interpreted as supportive robustness evidence rather than as a separate causal identification strategy.

9.11 Summary of Findings

The results point to a consistent empirical pattern. Settlements with greater wartime Albanian victimization gave higher vote shares to parties associated with active wartime resistance. This pattern appears in the descriptive tercile comparisons, in within-municipality regressions, in the pooled panel specification, and in the leave-one-municipality-out checks. The relationship is strongest and most stable from 2010 through 2021. In 2025, the coefficient weakens sharply and becomes statistically insignificant, consistent with the broader electoral realignment of Kosovo's party system.

The relationship is also politically specific. Wartime victimization is positively associated with active-party vote share, but not with passive-party vote share or Vetëvendosje vote share. Housing destruction provides partial corroborating evidence, especially in pooled specifications and in some within-municipality models, but the log-victimization measure yields the most robust and consistent results.

Finally, the IV estimates based on prewar Serbian settlement geography point in the same direction as the main OLS estimates from 2010 through 2021. However, because the exclusion restriction cannot be tested directly, these estimates are interpreted as supportive rather than decisive. The main conclusion is therefore cautious: the evidence is consistent with a persistent electoral legacy of wartime victimization, whereby settlements that suffered greater Albanian victimization became more likely to support active-resistance parties in the postwar period, with this relationship weakening in the most recent election.

10 Discussion and Contribution

This paper contributes to the literature on post-conflict politics by examining how wartime violence is associated with electoral support for parties rooted in different resistance strategies. Focusing on Kosovo, it shows how the legacy of armed versus passive resistance continued to shape democratic competition across multiple postwar elections. More broadly, the analysis speaks to debates on post-conflict democratization, political memory, and the persistence of wartime cleavages in electoral behavior.

Empirically, the main contribution of the paper is to provide settlement-level evidence that, within the same municipality, areas that experienced higher Albanian wartime victimization subsequently gave higher vote shares to parties associated with the armed resistance. This relationship is visible descriptively, in the victimization-tercile comparisons, and in the main municipality fixed-effects regressions. The association is positive and statistically significant from 2010 through 2021, but it weakens sharply and becomes statistically insignificant in 2025. This temporal pattern is important because it suggests that wartime political legacies were persistent, but not permanent.

The results also show that the relationship is politically specific. Wartime victimization is consistently associated with higher active-party vote share, but it does not generate an equally strong positive relationship with passive-party support or Vetëvendosje vote share. The weaker evidence for Hypothesis 2 is itself informative: it suggests that wartime violence primarily reinforced the armed-resistance bloc rather than directly punishing the passive-resistance party, which may reflect the more diffuse organizational and symbolic presence of LDK across municipalities regardless of local violence intensity. This distinction matters because it suggests that the empirical pattern is not simply a general association between violence and political mobilization, anti-incumbent voting, or support for opposition parties. Instead, the relationship is most consistent with a mechanism linking local memories of wartime threat, sacrifice, and protection to support for parties rooted in the armed-resistance bloc.

A second empirical contribution is to show that different measures of wartime exposure capture different forms of politically relevant variation. The strongest and most consistent evidence comes from log Albanian victims per 1,000 residents. Housing destruction is positively associated with active-party vote share in pooled specifications and remains significant in some within-municipality specifications, but the evidence is less stable than for victimization. This suggests that direct human losses may be more politically salient than physical destruction, or that the housing-damage measure captures more between-municipality variation in conflict intensity than within-municipality variation in

politically meaningful exposure.

The panel evidence reinforces this interpretation. In pooled panel models with municipality and election-year fixed effects, standardized victimization remains positively associated with active-party vote share and negatively associated with passive-party and Vetëvendosje vote shares. The year-interaction models further show that the victimization gradient is positive through 2021 but disappears in 2025. This pattern fits the broader transformation of Kosovo's party system, in which parties linked to the armed resistance declined over time while Vetëvendosje became the dominant political force. The electoral legacy of violence therefore persisted for a long period, but it was eventually weakened by party-system realignment and generational or political change.

The instrumental-variables evidence should be interpreted as supportive rather than definitive. The preferred IV strategy uses prewar Serbian settlement geography to predict wartime Albanian victimization. These estimates generally point in the same direction as the main fixed-effects results from 2010 through 2021, including in specifications that exclude the Drenica core. However, the exclusion restriction remains demanding. Prewar Serbian settlement geography may affect postwar voting through channels other than wartime victimization, including displacement, property conflict, postwar ethnic sorting, local economic geography, or long-run patterns of state presence. For this reason, the paper does not treat the IV results as conclusive causal proof. Rather, they provide additional evidence that is consistent with the main interpretation.

The Kosovo case also has broader substantive implications. It shows how competing resistance legacies can become embedded in postwar party competition. Parties associated with armed resistance may benefit electorally in places where wartime violence was more intense because they are perceived as credible representatives of wartime defense, collective sacrifice, and national survival. This may help incorporate former resistance actors into democratic politics, but it may also anchor electoral competition in wartime symbolism rather than programmatic contestation. In this sense, wartime legacies can have both stabilizing and constraining effects in post-conflict democracies.

At the same time, the findings should be read cautiously. The empirical strategy reduces many sources of confounding by comparing settlements within the same municipality and by controlling for population size, urban status, and ethnic composition. However, it cannot fully rule out unobserved within-municipality differences in prewar political organization, local KLA presence, terrain, road access, or community-level resistance networks. The paper therefore provides strong evidence of a robust and persistent within-municipality association, supported by additional IV and robustness checks, but it does not claim to fully isolate a single causal mechanism.

11 Conclusion

This paper examined whether settlements that experienced more intense wartime violence subsequently showed stronger electoral support for parties linked to active, armed resistance and weaker support for parties associated with passive, nonviolent resistance. Using settlement-level data from Kosovo across multiple postwar elections, the analysis finds that higher Albanian wartime victimization is associated with higher active-party vote share within municipalities.

The strongest evidence comes from the specification using log Albanian victims per 1,000 residents. In the main cross-year municipality fixed-effects estimates, victimization is positively and significantly associated with active-party vote share from 2010 through 2021. The standardized estimates show that a one-standard-deviation increase in victimization is associated with roughly two to four percentage points higher active-party support in these elections. In 2025, however, the relationship weakens substantially and becomes statistically insignificant. This suggests that the electoral legacy of wartime violence was persistent, but it declined as Kosovo's party system changed.

The results also show that the relationship is not equally strong across all political outcomes or all measures of wartime exposure. Victimization predicts support for active-resistance parties more consistently than it predicts support for passive parties or Vetëvendosje. Housing-damage proxies are positively associated with active-party vote share, especially in pooled specifications, but they provide less stable within-municipality evidence than the victimization measure. This suggests that local human losses were the most politically salient dimension of wartime exposure in the analysis.

The panel and robustness results reinforce the main conclusion. Pooled panel models with municipality and year fixed effects show a positive average relationship between standardized victimization and active-party support. Temporal-interaction models show that this relationship remains positive through 2021 but disappears in 2025. Drenica-exclusion and leave-one-municipality-out checks indicate that the main pattern is not driven solely by one municipality or by the Drenica core, although the broader conflict region is clearly important for the magnitude of the relationship.

The instrumental-variables analysis using prewar Serbian settlement geography points in the same general direction as the fixed-effects estimates, but it should be interpreted cautiously. The exclusion restriction cannot be fully verified, and prewar settlement geography may affect postwar political behavior through channels other than wartime victimization. For this reason, the paper presents the IV results as supportive evidence

rather than as definitive causal identification.

Overall, the paper shows that local wartime experience remained politically salient in Kosovo long after the conflict. Settlements that suffered greater Albanian victimization were more likely to support parties linked to the armed resistance, especially in the first two decades after the war. More broadly, the findings suggest that the political consequences of conflict persist not only through institutions, economic disruption, or elite bargaining, but also through local electoral behavior and partisan alignment. The Kosovo case therefore illustrates how wartime violence can leave durable, but eventually weakening, traces in democratic competition.

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A Dataset Construction

This appendix provides a full account of how the analytical datasets used in this paper were assembled. The empirical analysis draws on six cross-sectional election datasets covering Kosovo Assembly elections from 2010 to 2025, plus a balanced panel linking those six elections to a common set of time-invariant conflict and geographic controls. The construction proceeded in nine distinct stages applied uniformly across all years: electoral data preparation and vote share computation, coordinate assignment, 2011 census demographic matching, 1981 pre-war census matching, killings database merging, terrain and road distance computation, housing damage assessment merging, spatial and garrison instrument construction, KLA presence merging, and panel consolidation. Each stage is described below in sufficient detail to allow independent replication.

A.1 Overview of Data Sources

Table 30 summarises the primary data sources used in construction, the variable groups they produce, and their temporal coverage.

Table 30: Primary data sources

Source	Description	Variable group	Coverage	Years
CEC election results	Settlement-level party preference-mark counts	`vs_*`, `total_marks`, flags	594–740 settlements	2010–2025
Kosovo Census 2011	Interpolated settlement demographics	`cen_*`, `pct_*`	1,295 settlements	2011–2024
Yugoslav Census 1981	Pre-war settlement ethnic composition and population	`pre81_*`, `*_vpc_pre81`	1,419 settlements, 22 communes	1981
CEC polling centres 2025	Geocoded polling location coordinates	`lat`, `lon`	941 polling centres	2025
HRO killings database	Albanian victims of Serbian state violence	`kill_*`, `vpc`, `log_vpc`	13,078 victims	1998–1999
EC damage assessment	Post-conflict housing damage, four severity categories	`ass_*`	999 villages, 26 municipalities	1999
SRTM 90m DEM	Terrain ruggedness index	`tri_mean`, `log_tri`	All settlements	Static
OSM road network	Distance to nearest major road	`dist_road_km`, `log_dist_road_km`	All settlements	Static
VJ/MUP garrison locations	Pre-war Yugoslav Army and MUP facility coordinates	`Z_vj_ln`, `dist_*_km`	6 facilities	1980s–1999
OSCE KVM report 1999	Settlement-level KLA/UCK operational presence	`kla_osce_any`, `kla_osce_intensity`	209 matched settlements	1998–1999

Note: CEC = Central Election Commission of Kosovo. HRO = Human Rights Organisation. EC = European Commission. SRTM = Shuttle Radar Topography Mission. OSM = OpenStreetMap. VJ = Yugoslav Army (*Vojska Jugoslavije*). MUP = Ministry of Internal Affairs. OSCE KVM = OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission.

The unit of observation throughout is the vote settlement, defined as the administrative unit at which the CEC records party-level election returns. Settlement names appear in bilingual Albanian/Serbian format in most years; a name-normalisation function described below is applied uniformly before any cross-source matching.

A.2 Electoral Data Preparation and Vote Share Computation

A.2.1 Raw data structure

Kosovo's National Assembly elections use an open-list proportional representation system. Each voter casts a single party ballot and may additionally mark up to five candidate preferences within the chosen party list. The CEC publishes settlement-level CSV files recording, for each of the contesting parties, the number of preference marks received, not simple ballot counts. The row-wise sum of party mark columns, `total_marks`, therefore systematically exceeds the number of active valid ballots cast, typically by a factor of 1.6 to 2.3 depending on the election year.

Vote shares are computed as

$$vs_{p,i} = \frac{marks_{p,i}}{total\_marks_i},$$

which ensures that shares are bounded in $[0, 1]$ and sum to exactly one across parties within each settlement. Using the `Active political parties` column, which records total valid ballots cast rather than preference marks, as the denominator is incorrect under the open-list system and would produce shares that exceed one for individual parties. All `vs_*` columns in the analytical datasets use `total_marks` as the denominator.

The `Active political parties` column has a further complication in the 2017 dataset: it equals the PDK grand coalition column exactly for every row, rather than recording total valid ballots. This reflects a CEC data-entry convention for that election cycle. The vote share computation is unaffected since it uses `total_marks` throughout, but the `Active political parties` column should not be treated as a measure of total turnout in 2017.

A.2.2 Settlement consolidation

Several municipalities record city-level votes as multiple sub-district rows in the raw CEC files, corresponding to distinct urban neighbourhoods with separate polling jurisdictions. These must be consolidated into single city rows before analysis to avoid double-counting and to match the settlement units used in census and conflict data. Consolidation was applied in every election year to the following urban centres:

- **Prishtinë/Priština:** 15–40 neighbourhood rows consolidated per year, with naming conventions varying across years.

- **Prizren/Prizren:** 6–13 rows per year, including date-named neighbourhood rows and, in 2014, a row where an Excel date serialisation error produced an integer in place of a neighbourhood name.
- **Mitrovicë/Mitrovica:** 4–6 rows per year, including the main city row and sector sub-districts.
- **Vushtrri/Vučitrn:** 1–2 rows per year; a sector row present in some years was consolidated with the main city row.

Consolidation was performed by summing all numeric vote columns and retaining the first row's municipality metadata. In addition, *Viti/Vitina Town*, a zero-vote phantom row created by the CEC in several years, was merged into the main *Viti/Vitina* row before any further processing.

A.2.3 Quality flags

Two quality flags were constructed:

- `flag_extreme_marks`: settlements where `total_marks / Active political parties` exceeds 100 are flagged and dropped from all regressions. These are typically very small Serbian-minority settlements with implausibly high marks-to-ballots ratios.
- `flag_zero_votes`: settlements where `total_marks` equals zero are flagged and dropped. The 2010 base dataset predates this flag and it is reconstructed from `total_marks`.

A.2.4 Municipality naming

The four northern Serb-majority municipalities (Leposavić/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, Zvečan/Zveçan, and Mitrovica e Veriut/Severna Mitrovica) boycotted all six elections and are excluded from all analyses. Municipality names vary in casing, diacritics, and bilingual ordering across election years. A year-specific crosswalk standardises all names to the canonical mixed-case bilingual format before any merging or matching.

Table 31: Year-specific dataset characteristics

Year	Raw rows	After cleaning	Municipalities	Usable reg.	Census year	Party cols	Active definition
2010	630	562	32	562	2011	29	PDK + AAK
2014	804	601	34	601	2014	30	PDK-coalition + AAK + NISMA
2017	804	681	34	681	2017	24	PDK grand coalition
2019	802	696	34	696	2019	25	PDK + AAK-PSD + NISMA-AKR
2021	804	640	26	640	2021	28	PDK + AAK + NISMA + LpB
2025	802	468	34	468	2024	28	PDK + AAK-NISMA

Note: "Usable reg." excludes rows with `flag_extreme_marks == 1` and `flag_zero_votes == 1`. The 2021 dataset covers only 26 municipalities because eight municipalities boycotted the snap election.

A.3 Settlement Coordinates

Settlement-level coordinates are assigned from the CEC's 2025 polling centre register (941 geocoded locations). Each vote settlement was assigned coordinates as the mean latitude and longitude of all matched polling centres within that settlement, using exact-name matching, fuzzy matching (≥ 0.70), and municipality centroid fallback as a three-step cascade. For 2021 and earlier datasets, the same 2025 register was used since polling buildings do not change location across elections. Seven post-2010 municipalities absent from the 2010 coordinate source received hardcoded geographic centroids.

A.4 Census Demographic Controls: 2011 Interpolated Census

Demographic controls are drawn from a settlement-level dataset constructed as linearly interpolated annual estimates based on the 2011 Kosovo Population and Housing Census and 2024 population projections. Separate interpolated datasets were prepared for each election year. Each annual dataset records total population, male/female breakdown, counts for nine ethnic groups, and urban classification indicators.

A.4.1 Name normalisation

A uniform normalisation function was applied before any name comparison across all data sources: it replaces Serbian Đ/đ with Dj/dj, applies NFD decomposition to strip combining diacritical marks, removes all non-alphanumeric characters, and lowercases the result.

A.4.2 Matching cascade

Census settlements were matched to vote settlements using a four-step cascade within each municipality: exact Albanian name, fuzzy Albanian ≥ 0.75, fuzzy Albanian ≥ 0.55, and best-name fallback. Within each vote settlement, numeric census counts were summed and ethnic share variables recomputed. Census coverage is incomplete for five settlements with zero recorded population, which are excluded from specifications requiring census controls.

A.5 Pre-War Demographic Controls: 1981 Yugoslav Census

A.5.1 Source and structure

The 1981 Yugoslav Population Census provides settlement-level ethnic composition 17 years before the 1998–99 war, drawn from the official publication *National Structure of Population in SFR Yugoslavia, Vol. I.* The dataset contains 1,419 settlement rows across 22 communes of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, recording population counts for Albanians, Serbs, Muslims (Bosniaks/Gorani), Roma, Montenegrins, and Yugoslavs.

A.5.2 Municipality crosswalk

The 1981 census used 22 Yugoslav communes that do not correspond one-to-one with 2010 municipalities. A manual crosswalk maps each commune to the 2010 municipalities derived from it after Kosovo's post-1999 administrative restructuring. Several communes split into multiple 2010 municipalities: Kosovska Mitrovica became Mitrovicë, Vushtrri, and Gracanica; Orahovac became Rahovec and Malishevë. Matching was performed across all 2010 municipalities descended from the corresponding 1981 commune.

A.5.3 Matching cascade and coverage

The 1981 dataset records names in Serbian Latin script with OCR artefacts from the original scanned publication. Names were matched to 2010 vote settlements using a five-step cascade within crosswalk boundaries: exact match against the Serbian part of the 2010 bilingual name, exact match against the Albanian part, fuzzy ≥ 0.75 Serbian, fuzzy ≥ 0.55, and best-name fallback ≥ 0.50 (flagged as `pre81_low_confidence`). Of 1,350 matching attempts, 1,114 succeeded, covering 87.7 percent of 2010 analysis settlements. The full matching log is saved in `census_1981_match_map.csv`.

A.5.4 Variables constructed

The following pre-war variables are added to all year datasets and the panel:

- `pre81_pop`: 1981 total settlement population.
- `pre81_alb_share`, `pre81_serb_share`, `pre81_muslim_share`, `pre81_roma_share`: pre-war ethnic composition shares.
- `pre81_displace_ratio`: ratio of 2011 census population to 1981 population, proxying for net post-war demographic change.

Violence-per-capita rates are recomputed using 1981 population as the denominator:

$$log\_alb\_vpc\_pre81_i = \log\left(1 + \frac{\text{Albanian victim count}_i}{\text{1981 population}_i} \times 1000\right).$$

Using the 2011 post-war census population introduces endogeneity because wartime displacement depressed surviving populations in the most heavily affected settlements, mechanically inflating the per-capita rate. The 1981 denominator is fully pre-treatment. The raw correlation between the two measures is 0.814, indicating that the two population denominators capture broadly similar spatial patterns of wartime exposure, while still differing in the upper tail because the 1981 denominator is measured before wartime displacement and postwar demographic change.

A.6 Wartime Violence Measures

A.6.1 Killings database

The primary violence measure is constructed from a settlement-level database of Albanian victims of Serbian state violence during the 1998–99 conflict. The database records 13,153 victims, of which 13,078 (99.4 percent) were successfully matched to vote settlements. The preferred specification uses the pre-war denominator:

$$log\_alb\_vpc\_pre81_i = \log\left(1 + \frac{\text{Albanian victim count}_i}{\text{1981 population}_i} \times 1000\right).$$

Specifications using the 2011 census denominator are also reported for comparability.

A.6.2 Housing damage assessment

The secondary violence proxy derives from the European Commission post-conflict housing damage assessment (mid-1999), which classified each building into four damage categories. Three settlement-level variables are derived: `ass_pct_destroyed` (Category IV share), `ass_pct_damaged` (any damage), and `ass_damage_index` (weighted composite, weights 0.1, 0.3, 0.7, 1.0). Coverage is approximately 435 of 562 usable 2010 settlements; uncovered settlements receive 0 for all count and rate variables.

A.7 Geographic Controls and Instrumental Variables

A.7.1 Terrain ruggedness and road distance

The Terrain Ruggedness Index (`tri_mean`) is the mean absolute elevation difference between focal pixels and their eight neighbours, averaged within a 5 km radius of each settlement centroid from the SRTM 90m DEM (Wilson et al., 2007). Log-transformed as $\log(1+tri\_mean_i)$. Distance to the nearest major road (`dist_road_km`) is the great-circle distance to the nearest OpenStreetMap road feature.

A.7.2 KLA distance instrument

The existing additive instrument is:

$$Z\_tri\_road_i = -log\_dist\_kla\_km_i - log\_dist\_road\_km_i,$$

where `log_dist_kla_km` is the log great-circle distance to the Jashari compound in Prekaz, Skenderaj. One settlement (Prekaz i Ulët) has `dist_kla_km = 0`; a floor of 0.1 km is applied.

A.7.3 Spatial lag instruments from 1981 Serbian settlement geography

Three new instruments exploit the pre-war spatial distribution of Serbian communities. The motivating mechanism is ethnic corridor creation: Serbian counter-insurgency forces targeted Albanian settlements geographically adjacent to or surrounded by Serbian communities to create contiguous ethnically controlled territory. This spatial logic is fully predetermined by 1981 settlement geography, 17 years before the conflict.

- `Z_serb_lag`: population-weighted mean 1981 Serbian share of all other settlements

within 10 km.

- `Z_log_dist_serb`: log distance to the nearest settlement with a 1981 Serbian population share exceeding 20 percent. This is the **preferred single instrument**.
- `Z_pct_serb_neigh`: share of settlements within 10 km with Serbian majority (> 50 percent) in 1981.

All three instruments are computed using a common reference set of 511 settlements with 1981 Serbian share data. Within-municipality approximate Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics for `Z_log_dist_serb` range from 20 to 48 across election years and reach 75 in the pooled panel, well above the Stock-Yogo critical value of 10.

The exclusion restriction argument: conditional on own 1981 Albanian share (`pre81_alb_share`), own Serbian share (`pre81_serb_share`), and municipality fixed effects, the Serbian population composition of *neighbouring* settlements affects vote shares only through its effect on wartime violence. Unlike the KLA distance instrument, these instruments do not concentrate their identifying variation in the Drenica valley, where historically elevated Albanian national consciousness provides an alternative channel. `Z_serb_lag` and `Z_log_dist_serb` can be used jointly in an overidentified 2SLS system, enabling a Hansen J-test of overidentification.

A.8 Panel Dataset Construction

A.8.1 Stacking and name harmonisation

The six cross-sectional datasets are stacked into a long-format panel. Before stacking, seven municipality-name variants present in the 2010 base dataset were remapped to canonical names, and settlement names were canonicalised within each municipality-normalised Albanian key group. The dominant source of cross-year mismatch was bilingual versus Albanian-only naming (e.g. *Drenoc/Drenovac* vs. *Drenoc*). This step reduced 1,585 unique municipality-settlement name pairs to 791 canonical pairs.

A.8.2 Absorption of non-anchor settlements

A settlement is defined as an anchor if it appears in all six election years. After name harmonisation, 351 of 791 settlements qualify. Each non-anchor was assigned to its nearest anchor within the same municipality using haversine distance; vote counts were absorbed by summing preference mark columns and recomputing vote shares, kill rates,

and geographic controls. The 80 non-anchor settlements in eight municipalities with no anchors could not be absorbed; these municipalities are dropped from the balanced panel as their 2021 absence reflects genuine electoral non-participation.

A.8.3 Final balanced panel

The final analytical panel retains 26 non-boycotting municipalities and 351 anchor settlements, yielding 2,106 settlement-year observations. Geographic control variables that remained missing after municipality-mean imputation were filled with Kosovo-wide medians for the seven poThe omitted baseline year is 2010, so coefficients should be interpreted as differences relative to the 2010 victimization slope, not as the full year-specific slopes.st-2010 municipalities entirely absent from the 2010 base dataset.

Table 32: Balanced panel composition

Dimension	**Value**	**Description**
Panel observations	2,106	351 settlements observed in six election years
Usable observations	2,053	Observations retained after excluding flagged rows and missing census data
Settlements	351	Settlement anchors observed in every election year
Municipalities	26	Municipalities represented in the balanced analysis panel
Election years	6	2010, 2014, 2017, 2019, 2021, and 2025
Variables	228	Electoral, census, violence, geographic, and supplementary variables
Structural missingness	351	`vs_aak_harm` missing in 2017 by construction

Notes: The balanced panel contains settlement anchors observed in all six election years. The usable sample excludes observations flagged for data-quality problems or missing required census information. The municipality count reflects the restricted balanced-panel sample. The missing values are structural: `vs_aak_harm` is missing in 2017 because AAK did not run separately from the PDK-led coalition.

A.9 Harmonised Party Variable Definitions

Table 33: Harmonised party outcome definitions by year

Year	pct_active KLA-rooted	pct_passive LDK	pct_vv VV	Comparability note
2010	vs_pdk + vs_aak	vs_ldk	vs_vv	PDK and AAK run separately
2014	vs_pdk_coalition + vs_aak + vs_nisma	vs_ldk	vs_vv	PDK runs as coalition; AAK and NISMA separate
2017	vs_pdk_coalition	vs_ldk_akr	vs_lv	Grand coalition includes AAK and NISMA; LDK ran with AKR; VV ran as LV
2019	vs_pdk + vs_aak_psd + vs_nisma_akr	vs_ldk	vs_vv	PDK alone; AAK-PSD coalition; NISMA-AKR-PD
2021	vs_pdk + vs_aak + vs_nisma + vs_lpb	vs_ldk	vs_vv	All KLA-rooted parties run separately
2025	vs_pdk + vs_aak_nisma	vs_ldk	vs_vv	AAK and NISMA merged into one coalition list

Note: `vs_aak_harm` is set to missing for 2017 since AAK marks are not separately identifiable in the grand coalition column. All other harmonised variables are complete across all six years.

A.10 Replication Materials

All data construction code is available as documented Python scripts. The pipeline executes in the following order:

- `prepare_vote_[year].py`: settlement consolidation, vote share computation, quality flags.
- `assign_coordinates_[year].py`: polling centre coordinate assignment.
- `merge_census_[year].py`: 2011 census matching and demographic controls.
- `merge_supplementary_[year].py`: killings database, terrain, road distance, housing damage.
- `merge_census_1981.py`: 1981 census pre-war controls and pre-war violence denominators.
- `build_spatial_instruments.py`: spatial lag instruments from 1981 Serbian settlement geography.
- `build_garrison_instrument.py`: VJ/MUP garrison distance instrument.
- `merge_kla_presence.py`: OSCE KLA/UCK presence variables.
- `build_panel_2010_2025.py` → `rebalance_panel.py` → `aggregate_to_anchors.py`: panel construction.

The final cross-sectional datasets are named `vote_data_[year]_v8.csv`; the final panel is `kosovo_panel_v5.csv`. The R analysis script `Master_thesis_v2.R` loads the v8 files and the v5 panel and can be run independently of the Python pipeline.

B Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures



Figure 7: Geographic distribution of wartime violence and passive party vote share. The choropleth shading shows passive party vote share at the settlement level, with darker shades indicating higher support. Overlaid bubbles represent log Albanian victims per capita, where larger circles correspond to higher levels of wartime victimization. Northern Serb-majority municipalities excluded from the analysis are shown in grey. A clear concentration of wartime violence is visible in central Kosovo, particularly around the Drenica valley in Skenderaj municipality, where high-intensity victimization clusters spatially. In contrast to the active party pattern, these high-violence areas tend to exhibit comparatively lower passive party vote shares, suggesting a negative spatial association between exposure to violence and support for passive political actors.

Table 34: Extended Pooled Summary Statistics

variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Active vote share	3648	41.112	23.831	0.000	98.987
Passive vote share	3648	21.308	14.482	0.000	73.404
Vetëvendosje vote share	3648	22.830	18.454	0.000	88.889
Log Albanian victims per 1,000	3094	1.637	1.230	0.000	5.264
Standardized log victimization	3094	0.000	1.000	-1.331	2.948
Destroyed housing share	3512	0.168	0.195	0.000	1.000
Log population	3648	7.100	1.132	0.325	11.887
Urban settlement	3648	0.062	0.241	0.000	1.000
Serb population share	3648	0.044	0.168	0.000	1.000
Turk population share	3648	0.002	0.032	0.000	0.931
Bosniak population share	3648	0.023	0.128	0.000	1.000
Roma population share	3648	0.003	0.022	0.000	0.449
Ashkali population share	3648	0.006	0.029	0.000	0.446
Egyptian population share	3648	0.004	0.018	0.000	0.242
Gorani population share	3648	0.012	0.094	0.000	1.000
Other ethnicity share	3648	0.001	0.010	0.000	0.287
Log Albanian victims per 1,000, 1981 denominator	2718	1.771	1.339	0.000	7.920
Standardized log victimization, 1981 denominator	2718	0.000	1.000	-1.323	4.593
Housing damage index	3512	0.318	0.301	0.000	1.299
Damaged housing share	3512	0.451	0.399	0.000	1.891
1981 Albanian share	2718	0.841	0.252	0.000	1.000
1981 Serbian share	2718	0.107	0.195	0.000	1.000
1981 Muslim share	2718	0.035	0.155	0.000	1.000
1981 Roma share	2718	0.005	0.019	0.000	0.200
1981 displacement ratio	2718	3.551	22.658	0.005	416.000
Log distance to KLA location	3648	3.575	0.650	-2.303	4.503

Notes: The table reports pooled settlement-election summary statistics. Active vote share refers to the year-specific bloc of parties associated with the active armed resistance. Passive vote share refers to LDK or its year-specific coalition form. VV refers to Vetëvendosje. Wartime violence is measured as log Albanian victims per 1,000 residents. The 2011 and 1981 denominators refer to alternative population baselines.

Table 35: Extended Correlation Matrix

	Active	Passive	VV	Victims	Victims 1981	Destroyed	Damage	Pop.	Urban	Serb	Bosniak	Alb. 1981	Serb 1981	KLA dist.
Active	1.000	-0.109	-0.300	0.432	0.401	0.295	0.320	0.122	-0.087	-0.366	-0.204	0.453	-0.333	-0.410
Passive	-0.109	1.000	0.054	-0.046	-0.044	0.000	0.013	0.124	-0.031	-0.278	-0.186	0.252	-0.144	0.204
VV	-0.300	0.054	1.000	-0.051	-0.022	-0.108	-0.109	0.051	0.050	-0.211	-0.143	0.132	-0.021	0.089
Victims	0.432	-0.046	-0.051	1.000	0.814	0.435	0.485	-0.055	-0.050	-0.240	-0.144	0.306	-0.232	-0.390
Victims 1981	0.401	-0.044	-0.022	0.814	1.000	0.375	0.427	0.315	0.319	-0.238	-0.165	0.318	-0.246	-0.338
Destroyed	0.295	0.000	-0.108	0.435	0.375	1.000	0.916	0.069	-0.046	-0.170	-0.086	0.165	-0.115	-0.334
Damage index	0.320	0.013	-0.109	0.485	0.427	0.916	1.000	0.102	-0.054	-0.199	-0.112	0.211	-0.136	-0.392
Log population	0.122	0.124	0.051	-0.055	0.315	0.069	0.102	1.000	0.466	-0.274	-0.046	0.140	-0.151	-0.100
Urban	-0.087	-0.031	0.050	-0.050	0.319	-0.046	-0.054	0.466	1.000	0.038	-0.037	0.011	0.016	-0.026
Serb share	-0.366	-0.278	-0.211	-0.240	-0.238	-0.170	-0.199	-0.274	0.038	1.000	-0.036	-0.312	0.434	0.106
Bosniak share	-0.204	-0.186	-0.143	-0.144	-0.165	-0.086	-0.112	-0.046	-0.037	-0.036	1.000	-0.243	-0.106	0.126
Albanian share 1981	0.453	0.252	0.132	0.306	0.318	0.165	0.211	0.140	0.011	-0.312	-0.243	1.000	-0.583	-0.240
Serbian share 1981	-0.333	-0.144	-0.021	-0.232	-0.246	-0.115	-0.136	-0.151	0.016	0.434	-0.106	-0.583	1.000	0.139
KLA distance	-0.410	0.204	0.089	-0.390	-0.338	-0.334	-0.392	-0.100	-0.026	0.106	0.126	-0.240	0.139	1.000

Notes: The table reports pairwise correlations among the main outcome, exposure, control, and geographic variables. The matrix is reported in the appendix because of its size.

Table 36: Sample Construction

Sample restriction or dataset step	Observations	Notes
Pooled settlement-election sample	3,648	Six Assembly elections, 2010–2025
Main victimization sample	3,094	Non-missing logged victims per 1,000 residents
1981-denominator victimization sample	2,718	Matched to 1981 Yugoslav census population
Housing-destruction sample	3,512	Non-missing destroyed-housing proxy
Main cross-year FE sample	3,094	Year-specific samples with victimization and controls
Balanced panel sample	2,106	351 settlements observed in all six elections
Pooled panel estimation sample	1,688	Balanced panel with non-missing treatment and controls

Notes: The table summarizes the main analysis samples used in the paper. The pooled settlement-election sample contains all usable settlement-year observations from the 2010, 2014, 2017, 2019, 2021, and 2025 Kosovo Assembly elections after the main sample restrictions. The main victimization sample is restricted to observations with non-missing logged Albanian victims per 1,000 residents. The 1981-denominator sample uses prewar Yugoslav census population as the denominator. The balanced panel contains 351 settlements observed in all six elections; the pooled panel estimation sample is smaller because it also requires non-missing treatment and control variables.

Table 37: Robustness using the 1981-denominator victimization measure

Year	Obs.	Active	Passive	Vetëvendosje
2010	494	2.458***	-0.624	0.120
		(0.807)	(0.468)	(0.240)
2014	493	1.728**	-0.294	0.124
		(0.797)	(0.487)	(0.266)
2017	487	1.635***	-0.013	-0.181
		(0.571)	(0.428)	(0.437)
2019	466	2.098***	-0.682	0.097
		(0.640)	(0.430)	(0.341)
2021	459	1.797***	-0.377	0.262
		(0.633)	(0.315)	(0.505)
2025	319	-0.599	-0.038	0.074
		(0.733)	(0.432)	(0.677)
Municipality FE		Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls		Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports municipality fixed-effects OLS estimates using logged Albanian victims per 1,000 residents with the 1981 Yugoslav census population denominator. Outcomes are vote shares in percentage points. All specifications include standard settlement controls: log population, urban status, and ethnic composition shares. Robust HC1 standard errors are in parentheses. This table serves as a robustness check for the baseline 2011-denominator specification. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Tables 40 and 41 report reduced-form and diagnostic evidence for the preferred Serbian-geography instrument. The reduced form is positive and statistically significant from 2010 to 2021, including after excluding the Drenica core and the broader conflict region, but it becomes small and statistically insignificant in 2025. The first stage is positive and reasonably strong in the full sample through 2021, but weakens under broader regional exclusions and in 2025. These patterns support the interpretation that the IV evidence is consistent with the main fixed-effects results before 2025, while also reinforcing the decision to treat the IV estimates as supportive rather than definitive causal evidence.

Table 38: Supplementary instrumental-variable estimates, 2010–2019

Year	Spec.	Instrument	Obs.	OLS	2SLS	First stage	FS F	Weak-IV F	WH p
2010	Muni FE	KLA dist.	494	2.670***	144.901	-0.078	0.10	0.13	0.000
				(0.838)	(454.487)	(0.250)			
2010	Pooled	KLA dist.	494	6.541***	23.000***	-0.642***	81.13	70.83	0.000
				(0.872)	(2.917)	(0.071)			
2010	Muni FE	TRI-road	494	2.670***	47.991	-0.011	0.40	0.56	0.017
				(0.838)	(75.433)	(0.017)			
2010	Pooled	TRI-road	494	6.541***	7.476	0.064***	24.95	21.57	0.812
				(0.872)	(5.363)	(0.013)			
2014	Muni FE	KLA dist.	492	1.333*	898.308	-0.013	0.00	0.00	0.000
				(0.797)	(18420.699)	(0.258)			
2014	Pooled	KLA dist.	492	5.540***	23.893***	-0.630***	73.65	64.58	0.000
				(0.831)	(2.940)	(0.073)			
2014	Muni FE	TRI-road	492	1.333*	27.883	-0.021	0.32	0.40	0.214
				(0.797)	(54.723)	(0.038)			
2014	Pooled	TRI-road	492	5.540***	17.371***	0.175***	44.86	40.54	0.000
				(0.831)	(4.080)	(0.026)			
2017	Muni FE	KLA dist.	486	1.638***	261.914	-0.030	0.01	0.02	0.003
				(0.618)	(2193.879)	(0.253)			
2017	Pooled	KLA dist.	486	5.564***	16.739***	-0.629***	74.65	65.65	0.000
				(0.705)	(2.287)	(0.073)			
2017	Muni FE	TRI-road	486	1.638***	81.225	-0.008	0.05	0.07	0.080
				(0.618)	(350.594)	(0.036)			
2017	Pooled	TRI-road	486	5.564***	12.632***	0.175***	45.79	41.92	0.002
				(0.705)	(3.059)	(0.026)			
2019	Muni FE	KLA dist.	465	2.357***	-133.791	0.041	0.02	0.03	0.034
				(0.679)	(896.957)	(0.262)			
2019	Pooled	KLA dist.	465	6.162***	20.031***	-0.628***	72.77	62.17	0.000
				(0.709)	(2.583)	(0.074)			
2019	Muni FE	TRI-road	465	2.357***	69.059	-0.012	0.11	0.14	0.032
				(0.679)	(206.931)	(0.036)			
2019	Pooled	TRI-road	465	6.162***	13.011***	0.176***	46.46	40.40	0.003
				(0.709)	(3.259)	(0.026)			

Notes: The table reports supplementary IV estimates for active-resistance party vote share. The endogenous variable is logged Albanian victimization using the baseline denominator. "KLA dist." is logged distance to the KLA-related location. "TRI-road" is $Z_{\text{tri-road}}$. "Muni FE" specifications include municipality fixed effects; pooled specifications do not. All models include standard settlement controls and available prewar demographic controls. Robust HC1 standard errors are in parentheses. FS F is the manual robust first-stage statistic. Weak-IV F is the diagnostic from `AER::ivreg`; it is not labelled as Kleibergen–Paap. WH p is the Wu-Hausman p-value. The number of observations is smaller than in the baseline election-year samples because the IV specifications require non-missing instrument values and prewar demographic controls from the 1981 Yugoslav census. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 39: Supplementary instrumental-variable estimates, 2021–2025

Year	Spec.	Instrument	Obs.	OLS	2SLS	First stage	FS F	Weak-IV F	WH p
2021	Muni FE	KLA dist.	458	1.806***	-179.631	0.053	0.04	0.05	0.000
				(0.655)	(931.553)	(0.267)			
2021	Pooled	KLA dist.	458	5.701***	20.973***	-0.625***	71.67	60.78	0.000
				(0.777)	(2.780)	(0.074)			
2021	Muni FE	TRI-road	458	1.806***	26.508	-0.011	0.36	0.51	0.100
				(0.655)	(44.927)	(0.018)			
2021	Pooled	TRI-road	458	5.701***	10.300**	0.060***	20.34	16.78	0.216
				(0.777)	(5.059)	(0.013)			
2025	Muni FE	KLA dist.	317	-0.773	-4.011	-0.263	0.79	1.02	0.801
				(0.855)	(12.889)	(0.297)			
2025	Pooled	KLA dist.	317	4.812***	26.528***	-0.658***	59.40	51.88	0.000
				(1.163)	(4.263)	(0.085)			
2025	Muni FE	TRI-road	317	-0.773	31.879	-0.007	0.03	0.04	0.636
				(0.855)	(202.479)	(0.044)			
2025	Pooled	TRI-road	317	4.812***	17.781***	0.180***	35.95	28.22	0.000
				(1.163)	(5.009)	(0.030)			

Notes: See notes to Table 38. The resulting sample is therefore restricted to settlements that can be matched to the prewar census data.

Table 40: Reduced-form estimates for the Serbian-geography instrument

Sample	2010	2014	2017	2019	2021	2025
Full sample	1.966***	1.690***	1.611***	1.543***	1.419***	-0.413
	(0.568)	(0.572)	(0.437)	(0.551)	(0.478)	(0.472)
Excl. Drenica core	1.788***	1.527***	1.703***	1.380***	1.247***	-0.507
	(0.531)	(0.554)	(0.457)	(0.531)	(0.439)	(0.495)
Excl. broader conflict region	1.147**	0.901*	1.308***	0.967**	0.770**	-0.229
	(0.464)	(0.497)	(0.415)	(0.489)	(0.367)	(0.541)
Observations						
Full sample	494	492	486	465	458	317
Excl. Drenica core	447	445	439	422	415	288
Excl. broader conflict region	382	380	375	362	354	243

Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates from regressions of active-resistance vote share directly on the preferred Serbian-geography instrument. The dependent variable is active-resistance vote share, measured in percentage points. All specifications include municipality fixed effects, standard settlement-level controls, and available prewar demographic controls. "Excl. Drenica core" drops Skenderaj/Srbica and Gllogovc/Glogovac. "Excl. broader conflict region" additionally drops adjacent conflict-region municipalities. Robust HC1 standard errors are reported in parentheses.
$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 41: First-stage and IV diagnostics for the Serbian-geography instrument

Statistic / sample	2010	2014	2017	2019	2021	2025
First-stage coefficient						
Full sample	0.156***	0.173***	0.165***	0.172***	0.170***	0.160***
	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.044)
Excl. Drenica core	0.138***	0.156***	0.147***	0.154***	0.154***	0.118**
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.046)
Excl. broader conflict region	0.129***	0.143***	0.136***	0.143***	0.141***	0.099**
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.050)
Manual robust first-stage F-statistic						
Full sample	25.28	27.74	24.46	26.12	25.28	13.26
Excl. Drenica core	18.73	21.36	18.31	20.14	19.43	6.66
Excl. broader conflict region	14.53	16.44	14.34	15.54	14.77	3.93
Weak-IV F-statistic from `AER::ivreg`						
Full sample	21.64	23.83	20.83	22.63	21.46	11.36
Excl. Drenica core	15.61	17.78	15.23	16.84	16.01	5.69
Excl. broader conflict region	11.65	13.01	11.35	12.33	11.56	3.29
Wu-Hausman p-value						
Full sample	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.006	0.005	0.639
Excl. Drenica core	0.004	0.007	0.001	0.017	0.013	0.525
Excl. broader conflict region	0.048	0.066	0.008	0.079	0.087	0.792

Notes: The table reports first-stage and IV diagnostics for the preferred Serbian-geography instrument used in the main 2SLS specifications. The first-stage coefficient comes from regressions of logged Albanian victims per 1,000 residents on the Serbian-geography instrument. All specifications include municipality fixed effects, standard settlement-level controls, and available prewar demographic controls. The manual first-stage F-statistic is calculated using robust HC1 standard errors. The weak-IV F-statistic is the diagnostic reported by `AER::ivreg`; it is not labelled as a Kleibergen–Paap statistic. The Wu-Hausman p-value tests whether OLS and IV estimates differ. The models are just-identified, so no Sargan overidentification test is reported. Robust HC1 standard errors are reported in parentheses for the first-stage coefficient.
$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Figure 8: Year-specific municipality fixed-effects estimates



Notes: The figure plots year-specific municipality fixed-effects estimates from regressions of settlement-level vote shares on logged Albanian victims per 1,000 residents. The solid line reports estimates for active-resistance party vote share, while the dashed line reports estimates for passive-party vote share. Points show coefficient estimates and vertical bars show 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust HC1 standard errors. All specifications include log population, urban status, ethnic-composition controls, and municipality fixed effects. Significance levels are indicated above the corresponding estimates: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figures 8 and 9 visualize the year-specific municipality fixed-effects estimates. The active-party gradient is positive and statistically significant from 2010 through 2021, while it turns negative and becomes statistically insignificant in 2025. By contrast, the passive-party estimates remain small and statistically insignificant across election years. This pattern supports the interpretation that wartime victimization is specifically associated with support for active-resistance parties rather than with a general shift in vote shares across all political blocs.

Figure 9: Year-specific municipality fixed-effects estimates using standardized victimization



Notes: The figure plots year-specific municipality fixed-effects estimates using standardized logged Albanian victimization as the treatment variable. Each coefficient gives the percentage-point change in vote share associated with a one-standard-deviation increase in logged victimization. The solid line reports estimates for active-resistance party vote share, while the dashed line reports estimates for passive-party vote share. Points show coefficient estimates and vertical bars show 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust HC1 standard errors. All specifications include log population, urban status, ethnic-composition controls, and municipality fixed effects. Significance levels are indicated above the corresponding estimates: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 10: Spatial spillover exposure by election year



Notes: The figure maps the construction of the spatial spillover measure. Red points denote settlements with at least one recorded Albanian victim. Green points denote settlements with zero recorded Albanian victims that are located within 3 kilometres of at least one victimized settlement. Blue points denote zero-victim settlements that are not located within 3 kilometres of a victimized settlement. The spillover exercise compares green and blue settlements to assess whether proximity to violence is associated with electoral outcomes even in settlements without direct recorded victimization. The figure is descriptive and should not be interpreted causally, since nearby settlements may share unobserved wartime networks, local political histories, geography, or municipal conditions.